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Abstract
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1. Introduction
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are integrations of com-
putation, networking, and physical processes (Lee and Se-
shia, 2017; Cárdenas et al., 2008b). The key character-
istic of cyber-physical systems is their seamless integra-
tion of both hardware and software resources for com-
putational, communication and control purposes, all of
them co-designed with the physical engineered components
(Poovendran, 2010).
The economic and societal potential of cyber-physical
systems is astonishing, and major investments are being
made worldwide to develop the technology. For instance,
the December 2010 report of the U.S. President’s Coun-
cil of Advisors on Science and Technology (Holdren et al.,
2010) called for continued investment in CPS research be-
cause of its scientific and technological importance as well
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as its potential impact on grand challenges in a number
of sectors critical to U.S. security and competitiveness, in-
cluding aerospace, automotive, chemical production, civil
infrastructure, energy, healthcare, manufacturing, mate-
rials and transportation. Also, the anticipated funding
to research and education projects on CPS amounts to
approximately $34,000,000 each year (NSF 16-549, 2016),
and the European Union has a similar vision on the impor-
tance of research on CPS (Allocca and Wavering, 2013).
Applications of CPS arguably have the potential to
dwarf the 20-th century IT revolution (Lee and Seshia,
2017). Among the many applications of CPS we can find
high confidence medical devices and systems, assisted liv-
ing, traffic control and safety, advanced automotive sys-
tems, process control, energy conservation, environmental
control, avionics, instrumentation, critical infrastructure
control (electric power, water resources, and communica-
tions systems for example), distributed robotics (telepres-
ence, telemedicine), defense, manufacturing, smart struc-
tures, etc.
It goes without saying that in this type of systems se-
curity is a primary concern and, because of the tight
cyber-physical coupling, it is one of the main scientific
challenges. Indeed, CPS security is attracting several re-
search efforts from different and independent areas (e.g.,
secure control, intrusion detection in SCADA systems, etc.),
each of them with specific peculiarities, features, and ca-
pabilities.
However, if on one side having many research efforts
from different and independent areas on CPS security con-
firms its importance from a scientific point of view, on the
other side it is very difficult to have a holistic view on this
important domain. Under this perspective, even if the
progress of research on cyber-physical systems has started
more than ten years ago and the various research commu-
nities are very active, the trends, characteristics, and the
validation strategies of existing research on CPS security
are still unclear. With this work we aim at filling this gap.
CPS security is presently investigated in a number of scien-
tific (e.g. in Embedded Systems and Wireless Sensor Net-
works) communities from different points of view. In this
paper we focus on research on CPS security from the point
of view of the Automatic Control scientific community. A
first motivation for our choice is that most application do-
mains where CPS security is an issue consist of/include
distributed feedback-based automation systems. In ad-
dition to this, a peculiar characteristic of the Automatic
Control research is the attempt to combine in a unifying
mathematical framework physical components (e.g. elec-
trical/electronic devices, vehicles, and industrial automa-
tion machineries) and cyber components (e.g. SCADA sys-
tems, communication protocols, and real-time software) of
the CPS, as well as to define rigorous performance and ro-
bustness/resilience metrics on security properties based on
such unifying mathematical framework.
The goal of this work is to identify, classify, and an-
alyze existing research on CPS security from an automatic
control perspective in order to better understand how se-
curity is actually addressed when dealing with CPS. In
particular, we are interested in the works proposing meth-
ods or techniques for security enforcing or breaching in
cyber-physical realm. Under this requirement, the studies
that do not consider a physical phenomenon of interest,
or rely only on the typical IT security practices such as
classical encryption, are excluded.
In order to tackle our goal we applied a well-established
methodology from the Medical and Software Engineering
research communities called systematic mapping (Pe-
tersen et al., 2015; Kitchenham and Charters, 2007) (see
Section 2.3), applying it on the peer reviewed papers which
propose and validate a method or technique for CPS secu-
rity enforcing or breaching. Through our systematic map-
ping process, we selected 138 primary studies among al-
most three thousand entries fitting at best three research
questions we identified (see Section 3.2). Then, we de-
fined a classification framework composed of more than
40 different parameters for comparing state-of-the-art ap-
proaches, and we applied it to all selected studies. Finally,
we analyzed and discussed the obtained data for extract-
ing emergent research challenges and implications for fu-
ture research on CPS security. The main contributions
of this study are:
• a systematic review of current methods and tech-
niques in automatic control for CPS security, use-
ful for both researchers and practitioners since it is
not biased from personal experience; in particular,
it considers all the studies of the field of interest,
not only the known ones, searched with a validated
search method, and selects those proposing technical
solutions for security enforcing or breaching that are
based on automatic control;
• a reusable comparison framework for understanding,
classifying, and comparing methods or techniques for
CPS security from an automatic control perspective;
• a discussion of emerging research challenges and im-
plications for future research, that is based on both
the empirical results of a systematic mapping within
a time span of the first ten years of the field, and
the examination of the trends in research on CPS
security that have arisen after 2015.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper presents the first
systematic investigation into the state of the art of re-
search on CPS security from an automatic control per-
spective. The results of this study provide a complete,
comprehensive and replicable picture of the state of the
art of research on CPS security, helping researchers and
practitioners in finding trends, characteristics, and valida-
tion strategies of current research on security-aware cyber-
physical (co-)design, intrusion detection, forecast and re-
sponse, and its future potential and applicability. The
provided map presents several characteristics of security
of cyber-physical systems that researchers from Automatic
Control community care about. In addition to scientists
and practitioners from the same community, this survey is
useful also to researchers from the different communities
also working on cyber-physical systems, since it permits
to better understand the concerns that are complemen-
tary to their field of interest, opening the possibilities to
find a common ground in an easier way. Thanks to the
mapping of each feature to the related studies presented
explicitly, an interested reader can find immediately the
reference to the works of interest.
The main findings of our systematic analysis are dis-
cussed below:
Publication trends: in the last years there is an increas-
ing need and scientific interest on CPS security, especially
on the methods and techniques for security enforcing and
breaching. The research on security in the cyber-physical
domain is turning more and more into a mature field, with
more foundational and comprehensive studies published in
the recent years. This research area has a very multidis-
ciplinary nature and it has been broadly considered by
scientists with different research interests, such as smart
grid, automatic control, communications, networked sys-
tems, parallel and distributed systems, etc.
Characteristics and focus: the bulk of the works on CPS
security is focused on power grids, while somehow surpris-
ingly, we have not found any work on the cyber-physical se-
curity of medical CPS, and only a small part of selected pa-
pers is within the application field of secure control of (un-
manned) ground vehicles and aerial systems, and of heat-
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ing, ventilation, and air-conditioning in large functional
buildings. All the works considered in this mapping study
deal with attacks, in order to either implement or to coun-
teract them: putting together all this studies gives us the
possibility to categorize the existing (cyber-physical) at-
tack models. The defense strategies are presented in most
of the studies, occupying the central spot of the research
efforts on CPS security. The vast majority of the works
(89.9%) is concerned with system integrity, threatened by
various types of deception attacks. Regarding the consid-
ered system components, the approaches considering at-
tacks on sensors and their protection completely dominate
the scene; in fact the resilient state estimation (SE) under
measurement attacks is a very active research topic within
the area of CPS security. Somehow unexpectedly, very few
papers consider communication aspects or imperfections
and attempt to provide non-trivial mathematical models
of the communication; the centralized schemes dominate
both attack and defense solutions.
Validation strategies: most advanced and realistic vali-
dation methods have been exploited in the power net-
works application domain, but even there a benchmark
is still missing. Even if the repeatability process, captur-
ing how a third party may reproduce the validation results
of the method or technique, is recognized as a good scien-
tific practice, we found no studies providing a replication
package. So, we put a particular attention on analysis
and description of standard test systems and experimen-
tal testbeds used by researchers studying various aspects
of CPS security.
By presenting and discussing the above mentioned re-
sults we are the first to provide a complete, comprehensive
and unbiased overview of the state of the art of research in
CPS security from an automatic control perspective, thus
our work can certainly be useful for both researchers (ei-
ther young or experienced ones) and practitioners in the
field of CPS security. Finally, we use the results of the
systematic part of this study for examining the last trends
in the field and discussing potential implications for future
research on automatic control for CPS security.
Article outline. The article is organized as follows. In
Section 2 we provide background notions for setting the
context of our study. Section 3 describes in details our
research methodology in designing, conducting, and doc-
umenting the study1, followed by a discussion of the ob-
tained results in Sections 4, 5 and 6. We discuss the impli-
cations for future research on CPS security in Section 7,
and related work in Section 8. Section 9 closes the article.
In Appendix A we discuss some additional characteris-
tics of our primary studies, which are not related to CPS
security per se, but are still useful to better understand
this scientific area. Finally, Appendix B describes limita-
tions and threats to validity of our results.
1Readers mainly interested in the results of our study and future
research directions may directly jump to subsequent sections and
come back to this section afterwards.
2. Background
2.1. Cyber-physical systems
The term cyber-physical systems emerged around 2006,
when it was coined at the National Science Foundation
(NSF) (Lee and Seshia, 2017), with the “cyber” part of
the name resulting from the term “cybernetics”, intro-
duced as metaphor apt for control systems. Nowadays,
CPS can be seen as a family of control systems related
to the domain of embedded sensor and actuator networks
(Cárdenas et al., 2008b), thus close relative of Process
Control Systems (PCS) and of Supervisory Control And
Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. However, the seam-
less integration of computational, communication and con-
trol resources, co-designed together with physical engineered
components (Allocca and Wavering, 2013) is what sets
CPS discipline apart (Poovendran, 2010).
2.2. Security of CPS
Uncertainty in the environment, security attacks, and
errors in physical devices make ensuring overall system
security a critical challenge for CPS (Rajkumar et al.,
2010). Furthermore, a cyber-physical coupling allows so-
phisticated adversaries to perform attacks threatening also
other key attributes of the system, first and foremost safety
(Koscher et al., 2010; Chen and Abu-Nimeh, 2011). This
is the reason why, among several crucial requirements of
CPS, today many researchers are interested in various
(unique) aspects of CPS security; for example investigat-
ing on combined cyber-physical attack models (Teixeira
et al., 2015b), and on attack detection and identification
monitors (Pasqualetti et al., 2013).
CPS security presents a number of peculiar characteris-
tics that distinguish it from more conventional IT systems
security (Stouffer et al., 2015). For instance, with cyber-
physical systems we have real-time requirements, where
response is time-critical, modest throughput is acceptable,
high delay and/or jitter is not tolerable, and response to
human or other emergency interaction is essential. Such
systems are often resource-constrained and may not tol-
erate typical IT security practices. Even the usual defini-
tion of security as the combination of three primary secu-
rity attributes of confidentiality, integrity and availability
(Avižienis et al., 2004) assumes for the CPS a completely
new meaning (Cárdenas et al., 2008a). Given that the es-
timation and control algorithms used in CPS are designed
to satisfy certain operational goals, such as, closed-loop
stability, safety, liveness, or the optimization of a perfor-
mance function, availability in CPS can be viewed as the
ability to maintain the operational goals by preventing or
surviving denial-of-service (DoS) attacks to the informa-
tion collected by the sensor networks, the commands given
by the controllers, and the physical actions taken by the
actuators. Similarly, CPS integrity aims to maintain the
operational goals by preventing, detecting, or surviving de-
ception attacks in the information sent and received by the
sensors, the controllers, and the actuators. The intent of
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confidentiality in cyber-physical systems is to prevent an
adversary from inferring the state of the physical system
by eavesdropping on the communication channels between
the sensors and the controller, and between the controller
and the actuator or by means of side channel attacks (Tiri,
2007) on sensors, controllers and actuators.
2.3. Systematic mapping studies
A systematic mapping study (or scoping study) is a
research methodology particularly intended to provide an
unbiased, objective and systematic instrument to
answer a set of research questions by finding all of the rel-
evant research outcomes in a specific research area (CPS
security in our paper) (Petersen et al., 2015). Research
questions of mapping studies are designed to provide an
overview of a research area by classifying and counting
research contributions in relation to a set of well-defined
categories such as publication type, forum, frequency, as-
sumptions made, followed research method, etc. (Kitchen-
ham and Charters, 2007; Petersen et al., 2008). The map-
ping process involves searching and analyzing the litera-
ture in order to identify, classify, and understand existing
research on a specific topic of interest.
In the recent years many researchers are conducting
systematic mapping studies on a number of areas and us-
ing different guidelines or methods (e.g., on technical debt
(Li et al., 2015b), search-base software engineering (Lopez-
Herrejon et al., 2015), model-driven engineering for wire-
less sensor networks (Malavolta and Muccini, 2014)). In
a recent study (Petersen et al., 2015) it emerged that at
least ten different guidelines have been proposed for de-
signing the systematic mapping process. We conducted
our study by considering the two most commonly accepted
and followed guidelines according to Petersen et al. (2015),
specifically: the ones proposed by Kitchenham and Char-
ters (2007) and Petersen et al. (2008), respectively. Also,
we refined our mapping process according to the results
of a consolidating update on how to conduct systematic
mapping studies proposed by Petersen et al. (2015). Fi-
nally, due to the various specificities of existing research
on CPS (e.g., the presence of many different definitions of
CPS, the intrinsic multidisciplinarity of existing research
on CPS, etc.), we found it appropriate to tailor the method
and classification schemes proposed in the guidelines ac-
cording to our topic. The method we followed in our sys-
tematic study is detailed in Section 3.
2.4. The need for a systematic mapping study on security
for CPS
As it was outlined in the introduction, there is a lack of
systematic studies on CPS security. In order to ground this
claim and establishing the need for performing a mapping
study on security for cyber-physical systems, we searched
a set of electronic data sources (i.e. , those listed in Sec-
tion 3.3), for systematic studies on security-aware cyber-
physical co-design, self-protection and related security mech-
anisms specific to CPS2 without any success. None of the
retrieved publications was related to any of our research
questions detailed in Section 3.2. So, we can claim that
our research complements the related works described in
Section 8 to investigate the state-of-research about CPS
security.
3. Method
The process we followed for carrying on our study can
be divided into three main phases, which are the well-
accepted ones for performing a systematic study (Kitchen-
ham and Charters, 2007; Wohlin et al., 2012): planning,
conducting, and documenting. In order to mitigate po-
tential threats to validity, some produced artifacts in each
phase have been circulated to external experts for inde-
pendent review. One systematic literature review (SLR)
expert and two experts of CPS security reviewed our re-
view protocol and final report independently and we re-
fined them according to their feedback.
3.1. Main phases of systematic survey
In the following we will go through each phase of the
process, highlighting its main activities and produced ar-
tifacts.
3.1.1. Planning
In this phase we identified the main research questions
(see Section 3.2) and we produced a well-defined review
protocol describing in details the various steps of our study.
The final version of the review protocol is publicly available
as part of the replication package of this study3.
3.1.2. Conducting
In this phase we set the previously defined protocol into
practice. More specifically, we performed the following
activities:
• Studies search: we performed a combination of tech-
niques for identifying the comprehensive set of can-
didate entries on automatic control for CPS security
(see Section 3.3).
• Studies selection: we filtered candidate entries in or-
der to obtain the final list of primary studies to be
considered in later activities of the review (see Sec-
tion 3.3).
• Comparison framework definition: we defined the
set of parameters for comparing the primary studies.
The main outcome of this activity is a document ex-
plaining the possible values and the meaning of each
parameter (see Section 3.5).
2Search performed on January 5, 2015.
3Replication package of this study: https://doi.org/10.5281/
zenodo.2549614
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• Data extraction: we went into the details of each
primary study and extracted data according to the
comparison framework defined in the previous activ-
ity (see Section 3.5).
• Data synthesis: we elaborated on the extracted data
in order to address each research question of our
study. This activity involved both quantitative and
qualitative analysis of the extracted data (see Sec-
tion 3.6).
3.1.3. Documenting
The main activities performed in this phase are: (i)
a thorough elaboration on the data extracted in the pre-
vious phase with the main aim at setting the obtained
results in their context, (ii) the analysis of possible threats
to validity, and (iii) the writing of a set of reports describ-
ing the performed mapping study to different audiences.
Produced reports have been evaluated by SLR- and CPS-
experts (this article itself is an instance of produced final
report).
3.2. Research questions
It is fundamental to clearly define the research ques-
tions of a systematic literature study (Brereton et al.,
2007). Before going into the details of the identified re-
search questions, we formulate the goal of this research
by using the Goal-Question-Metric perspectives (i.e. , pur-
pose, issue, object, viewpoint (Basili et al., 1994)). Table 1
shows the result of the formulation mentioned above.
The goal presented above can be refined into the fol-
lowing main research questions. For each research question
we also provide its primary objective of investigation. The
research questions of this study are:
• RQ1 - What are the publication trends of research
studies on automatic control for CPS security?
Objective: to classify primary studies in order to as-
sess interest, relevant venues, and contribution types.
• RQ2 - What are the characteristics and focus of ex-
isting research on automatic control for CPS secu-
rity?
Objective: to analyze and classify all the existing
approaches for automatic control for CPS security
with respect to the specific concerns they want to
address (e.g., cyber and physical security, secure con-
trol, model-based intrusion detection, or any combi-
nation of them).
• RQ3 - What are the validation strategies of existing
approaches for automatic control for CPS security?
Objective: to analyze and classify all the existing
approaches for automatic control for CPS security
with respect to the strategies used for assessing their
validity (e.g., controlled experiment, industrial appli-
cation, prototype-based experiment, test bed, simple
examples, formal proofs).
Answer to RQ1 gives a detailed overview about publication
trends, venues, and research groups active on the topic.
The classification resulting from our investigation on RQ2
and RQ3 provides a solid foundation for a thorough com-
parison of existing and future solutions for CPS security
via automatic control. These contributions are especially
useful for researchers willing to further contribute this re-
search area with new approaches to CPS security or willing
to better understand or refine existing ones.
3.3. Search strategy
In order to achieve maximal coverage, our search strat-
egy consists of three complementary methods: an auto-
matic search, manual search, and snowballing. Fig. 1
shows the details about our search strategy, and a detailed
description of our application of the aforementioned meth-
ods is described in the following.
3.3.1. Automatic search
It refers to the execution of a search query on a set of
electronic databases and indexing systems, in the litera-
ture it is the dominant method for identifying potentially
relevant papers (Chen et al., 2010). The applied search
string is the following:
((((‘‘cyber physical’’ OR ‘‘cyber-physical’’ OR
cyberphysical OR ‘‘networked control’’) AND
system*) OR CPS OR NCS) AND (attack* OR secur*
OR protect*))
In the spirit of Zhang, Ali Babar and Tell (2011a),
we established a quasi-gold standard (QGS) for creating a
good search string for the automatic search. This proce-
dure requires a manual search in a small number of venues
(see Table 2) and the results of these manual searches have
been treated as a QGS by cross-checking the results ob-
tained from the automatic search. So we iteratively defined
and refined the search string, and conducted automatic
searches on the electronic data sources until the quasi-
sensitivity was above the established threshold of 80%.
When the quasi-sensitivity became greater than 80%, the
search performance was considered acceptable and the re-
sults from the automated search have been merged with
the QGS. The details of the above mentioned process are
provided in the replication package of this study.
In this stage it was fundamental to select papers ob-
jectively so, following the suggestions from Wohlin et al.
(2012), two researchers assessed a random sample of the
studies and the inter-researcher agreement has been mea-
sured using the Cohen Kappa statistic (Cohen, 1968). Each
disagreement has been discussed and resolved, with the in-
tervention of the team administrator, if necessary, until the
Cohen Kappa statistic reached a result above or equal to
0.80.
Our automatic search is performed on the largest and
most complete scientific databases and indexing systems
available in computer science (see the leftmost part of
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Table 1: Goal of this study
Purpose Analyze the
Issue publication trends, characteristics, and validation strategies
Object of existing methods and techniques for CPS security
Viewpoint from a researcher’s point of view.
Fig. 1: Overview of the search and selection process
Fig. 1). The selection of these electronic databases and
indexing systems is guided also by their high accessibility
and their ability to export search results to well-defined
formats.
Among the results of the automatic searches we re-
moved a set of false positives in order to work on a polished
set of potentially relevant studies (see Fig. 1). Examples of
false positives include proceedings of conferences or work-
shops, tables of contents, maps, lists of program committee
members, keynotes, tutorial or invited talks, and messages
from (co-)chairs. As shown in Fig. 1, our automatic search
resulted in 2543 potentially relevant studies.
3.3.2. Manual search
By following the quasi-gold standard procedure defined
in Zhang et al. (2011a), we (i) identified a subset of im-
portant venues for the domain of cyber-physical systems
security (they are shown in Table 2), and (ii) performed
a manual search of relevant publications in those venues.
The search have been performed by considering title and
abstract of each publication and the considered time inter-
val is between December 2008 and November 2014 (since
the earliest of above mentioned venues dates back to De-
cember 2008). By referring to Fig. 1, we manually searched
and selected 289 potentially relevant studies.
After merging all the studies and removing duplicates
we obtained 2828 potentially relevant studies. In order
to further restrict the number of studies to be considered
during the snowballing activity, we applied the selection
process depicted in Section 3.4 to the current set of studies,
thus obtaining 92 potentially relevant studies. In order to
handle studies selection in a cost effective way we used the
adaptive reading depth, as the full-text reading of clearly
excluded approaches is unnecessary. So, we considered
title, keywords and abstract of each potentially relevant
study and, if selection decision could not be made, other
information (like conclusion or even full-text) have been
exploited (Zhang et al., 2011a).
3.3.3. Snowballing
We applied the snowballing technique for identifying
additional sources published in other journals or venues
(Greenhalgh and Peacock, 2005), which may not have been
considered during the automatic and manual searches. So,
as recommended in Jalali and Wohlin (2012), we applied
(backward and forward) snowballing on the primary stud-
ies selected by the automatic and manual searches. More
specifically, we considered all the studies selected by the
automatic and manual searches, and we searched all the
papers referring them (i.e., forward snowballing (Wohlin,
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Table 2: Selected venues for manual search
Venue Publisher
International Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems (HiCoNS) ACM
International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection (IJCIP) Elsevier
International Symposium on Resilient Control Systems (ISRCS) IEEE
2014)); then, we scrutinized also the references of each se-
lected study to identify important studies that might have
been missed during the initial search (i.e., backward snow-
balling (Wohlin, 2014)).
3.4. Selection strategy
As recommended in the guidelines for performing SLRs
from Kitchenham and Charters (2007), we considered all
the collected studies and filtered them according to a set of
well-defined inclusion and exclusion criteria. In the follow-
ing we provide the inclusion (I) and exclusion (E) criteria
of our study:
• I1: Studies focusing on security of cyber-physical
systems.
• I2: Studies proposing a method or technique for CPS
security enforcing or breaching based on automatic
control.
• I3: Studies providing some kind of validation of the
proposed method or technique (e.g., via formal anal-
ysis, controlled experiment, exploitation in industry,
example usage).
• E1: Studies not subject to peer review (Wohlin et al.,
2012) (e.g., journal papers are considered, whereas
white papers are discarded).
• E2: Studies written in any language other than En-
glish.
• E3: Studies focusing on security method or tech-
nique not specific to CPS (e.g., studies focusing on
either the physical or cyber part only of the system
under consideration; under this criterion the studies
that do not consider a physical phenomenon of inter-
est, sometimes called the “plant”, or rely only on the
typical IT security practices such as classical encryp-
tion, are excluded. See Halperin et al. (2008), Zhang
et al. (2011b), and Muradore and Quaglia (2015) as
examples of notable research papers excluded by this
criterion).
• E4: Studies published before 2006 (since the CPS
discipline has emerged in 2006).
• E5: Secondary or tertiary studies (e.g., SLRs, sur-
veys, etc.).
• E6: Studies in the form of tutorial papers, short pa-
pers, poster papers, editorials, because they do not
provide enough information.
A study was selected as a primary study if it satisfied all
inclusion criteria, and it was discarded if it met any exclu-
sion criterion. In order to reduce bias, the selection criteria
of this study have been decided during the review protocol
definition (thus they have been checked by three external
reviewers). By following the approach proposed in Ali and
Petersen (2014), two researchers classified each potentially
relevant study either as relevant, uncertain, or irrelevant ;
studies classified as irrelevant have been excluded, whereas
all the other approaches have been discussed with the help
of a third researcher. For each potentially relevant study
we firstly analysed it by considering its title, keywords,
and abstract; secondly, if the analysis did not result in a
clear decision, also its introduction and conclusions have
been analysed; finally, we performed a comprehensive third
manual step in which we read the full text of all considered
studies (title, abstract, keywords, all sections and appen-
dices, if any) in order to take a final decision.
When reading a primary study in details for extracting
its information, researchers could agree that the currently
analyzed study was semantically out of the scope of our
research, and so it has been excluded (see the Exclusion
during Data Extraction stage in Fig. 1), resulting in 235
potentially primary studies.
As suggested in Wohlin et al. (2012), if a primary study
was published in more then one paper (e.g., if a confer-
ence paper has been extended to a journal version) then
we considered only one reference paper as primary study;
in those cases we considered all the related papers during
the data extraction activity in order to obtain all the nec-
essary data (Kitchenham and Charters, 2007). The final
set of primary studies is composed of 138 entries after a
duplicates merging step.
3.5. Data extraction
Data extraction refers to the recording of all the rel-
evant information from the primary studies required to
answer the research questions (Wohlin et al., 2012). Be-
fore analysing each primary study, we defined a compar-
ison framework for classifying research studies on cyber-
physical systems security from an automatic control per-
spective.
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To help the definition of a sound and complete compar-
ison framework, we selected and adapted suitable dimen-
sions and properties found in existing surveys and tax-
onomies related to CPS security, such as those proposed
in Yuan et al. (2014), Avižienis et al. (2004), Yampolskiy
et al. (2013). In addition, we defined several parameters
for classifying methods and techniques for CPS security;
we grouped those parameters into three main dimensions:
method or technique’s positioning, characterization, and
validation. The Positioning dimension characterizes the
objectives and intent of existing research on CPS security
(the WHAT aspect of each method or technique). The
Characterization dimension concerns the classification
of studies based on HOW CPS security is addressed in re-
search on automatic control. Finally, the Validation di-
mension concerns the strategies researchers apply for pro-
viding evidence about the validity of proposed methods or
techniques.
All the dimensions and parameters of our classification
framework have been encoded in a dedicated data extrac-
tion form, which can be seen as the implementation of a
comparison framework. The data extraction form is com-
posed of a list of attributes representing the set of data
items extracted from the primary studies. Our data ex-
traction form has been designed to collect such information
from each primary study; it includes both standard infor-
mation (such as name of reviewer, date of data extrac-
tion, title, authors and publication details of the study)
(Kitchenham and Charters, 2007) and the set of parame-
ters to compare the primary studies according to the three
dimensions described above (e.g., the used state estima-
tion model, attack model, experimental testbed, etc.). For
the sake of brevity we do not provide the description of
all the parameters of our data extraction form, we will
briefly elaborate on each of them while discussing the re-
sults of this study in Sections 4, 5 and 6; The interested
reader can refer to our replication package for a thorough
and extensive discussion of all parameters of our classifi-
cation framework. As suggested in Wohlin et al. (2012),
the data extraction form (and thus also the classification
framework) has been independently piloted on a sample of
primary studies by two researchers, and iteratively refined
accordingly. Then, the data extraction activity has been
conducted by two researchers.
3.6. Data synthesis
The main goal of our data synthesis activity is to under-
stand, analyze, and classify current research on automatic
control for CPS security (Kitchenham and Charters, 2007,
§ 6.5). Depending on the parameters of the classification
framework (see Section 3.5), in this research we applied
both quantitative and qualitative synthesis methods.
For each parameter of the classification framework we
divided our quantitative analysis on two main steps: (i) we
counted the number of primary studies falling in relevant
categories in the context of the specific parameter and (ii)
we aggregated and visualized the extracted information
to better clarify similarities and differences between the
primary studies.
For what concerns the analysis of qualitative data, we
used the keywording method for identifying also the pos-
sible values of each parameter of the classification frame-
work, and then we analysed and summarized the trends
and collected information in a quantitative manner. Key-
wording aims at reducing the time needed in clustering
qualitative data into meaningful cateogires and ensures
that it takes the considered studies into account (Petersen
et al., 2008). Keywording is done in two steps:
1. Collect keywords: we collect keywords by reading the
fragment of primary study related to each qualitative
parameter. When all fragments have been analysed,
all keywords are combined together. The output of
this stage is the set of keywords as they have been
used in each primary study.
2. Cluster keywords and form categories: when key-
words have been collected, then a clustering oper-
ation is performed on them in order to have a set of
representative clusters of keywords. We identify the
clusters by applying the open card sorting technique
(Spencer, 2009) to categorize keywords into relevant
groups. More specifically, we consider all the identi-
fied keywords and iteratively grouped them together
until a saturation of all the concepts is achieved and
all primary studies are analyzed. The output of this
stage is the set of possible values that each qualita-
tive parameter can have according to the identified
clusters of keywords.
Finally, we carried out a narrative synthesis of the re-
sults obtained both quantitatively and qualitatively. Nar-
rative synthesis refers to a commonly used method to syn-
thesize research in the context of systematic reviews where
a textual narrative summary is adopted to explain the
characteristics of primary studies (Popay et al., 2006), usu-
ally in conjunction with some form of statistical analysis
(Rodgers et al., 2009; Cruzes and Dyb̊a, 2011). In the con-
text of our study, for each parameter of our classification
framework we firstly summarized it from a quantitative
perspective (i.e., statistical summary) and then we com-
plemented such quantitative analysis by applying the gen-
eral framework for narrative synthesis proposed in Popay
et al. (2006), namely: (i) we developed a theory about the
specific values of the parameter by tabulating the results
and iteratively performing content analysis sessions, (ii) we
realized a preliminary synthesis of findings based on the
quantitative analysis, (iii) we explored potential relation-
ships in the data (i.e., horizontal analysis), (iv) we assessed
the robustness of the synthesis by critically reflecting on
the synthesis process and checking the obtained synthesis
with authors of primary studies (Popay et al., 2006).
In the following sections we present the results of our
analysis of the extracted data. In total 138 publications
have been selected and analyzed as the subjects of our
study. For the sake of clarity we organized the results
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of the analysis according to our research questions (see
Section 3.2).
4. Results - Publication Trends (RQ1)
In order to assess the publication trends on CPS secu-
rity, we identified a set of variables focusing on the pub-
lication and bibliographic data of each primary study. In
the following we describe the main facts emerging from
our analysis.
4.1. Publication timeline
Fig. 2 presents the distribution of the selected publica-
tions4 on security for cyber-physical systems over the time
period from 2006 to 2015. The first interesting result is
the growth of the number of those publications in the last
years. From the collected data, we can offer the following
observations:
• there are no selected studies until 2009, the year in
which the famous false data injection attack (Liu
et al., 2011) has been introduced;
• starting from 2012, there is a sharp increase in the
number of selected studies; we can trace this obser-
vation to the fact that (i) in the last years methods
and techniques for CPS security are gaining increas-
ing interest and attention from a scientific point of
view and (ii) methods and techniques for CPS secu-
rity are getting urgently needed to produce industry-
ready systems with the required levels of security and
reliability;
• finally, we can notice that 112 (81.2%) out of the 138
studies were published during the last three years;
this can be seen as an indication that CPS security
is a relatively new area, which is gaining more and
more traction from a scientific point of view; this
observation is further strengthened by the fact that
41.3% of the studies was published in 2015 alone.
Fig. 3 shows the distribution of targeted types of venues
over the years. The most common publication types are
journal and conference, with 61 (44.2%) and 69 (50.0%) of
primary studies, respectively. Such a high number of jour-
nal and conference papers may indicate that CPS secu-
rity is becoming more and more a mature research theme,
despite its relative young age (the first publication on
CPS security from an automatic control perspective was
in 2009).
4See Section 3.4 for details on selection strategy, which, of course,
determined the results presented here.



































Fig. 3: Types of publications over the years
5. Results - Characteristics and Focus of Research
(RQ2)
As already introduced in Section 3.5, we identified a
set of variables describing positioning and characteriza-
tion of methods and techniques for CPS security breach-
ing and/or enforcing. With the purpose of evaluating
what aspects of system are attacked or protected by an
approach, in the following we indicate which application
fields, points of view, security attributes, system compo-
nents, plant models, SE and anomaly detection algorithms,
controllers, communication aspects and network-induced
imperfections are considered by each primary study. Fur-
thermore, we give an account of attacks and their charac-
teristics, attack and defense schemes, plant models used by
an attacker and defense strategies, in order to understand
how these methods and techniques are characterized.
5.1. CPS application field
The mapping of individual studies to application fields
is reported in Table 3, while the distribution of studies by
application area is outlined by Figs. 4, 5, 6.
9
Table 3: Application field.
Application field Primary studies
Building automation D’Innocenzo et al. (2015)
Irrigation and water supply Amin et al. (2010); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Smith (2015); Teixeira et al. (2012, 2015b)
Linear dynamical systems Amin et al. (2009); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015, 2014);
Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); De Persis
and Tesi (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Do et al. (2015); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014);
Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Gupta et al. (2010); Jones et al. (2014); Kogiso and Fujita
(2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon et al. (2014); Lee et al. (2015); Li et al.
(2015b,c); Liu et al. (2014c); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao et al. (2014); Mishra et al.
(2014, 2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Pajic et al. (2015);
Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Qi et al. (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013,
2015b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al.
(2012, 2015b); Tiwari et al. (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xu and Zhu (2015);
Yang et al. (2016); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2015, 2014); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar
(2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Nonlinear dynamical systems Bezzo et al. (2015); Jones et al. (2014); Mo and Sinopoli (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a,b);
Smith (2015); Tiwari et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Power grid: generation Amini et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Hammad et al. (2015b,a); Liu et al. (2014b);
Mishra et al. (2015a); Nudell et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Wei and Kundur
(2015)
Power grid: transmission Amini et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang (2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Davis et al. (2012);
Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Esmalifalak et al. (2011); Fawzi et al. (2014); Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al. (2015);
Hammad et al. (2015a); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa
(2012); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014b, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Li et al.
(2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a,b, 2015a,b, 2011); Manandhar et al. (2014);
Mishra et al. (2015a); Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pasqualetti et al. (2011, 2013); Qin et al. (2013);
Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Sanandaji et al.
(2014); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Tajer et al. (2011); Talebi et al.
(2012); Tan et al. (2014); Teixeira et al. (2010); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al.
(2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Yu and
Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Zhang and Sankar (2015); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Power grid: distribution Amini et al. (2015); Anwar et al. (2015); Lo and Ansari (2013); Mishra et al. (2015a); Mohsenian-Rad and
Leon-Garcia (2011); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Teixeira et al. (2015a)
Power grid: electricity market Bi and Zhang (2013); Choi and Xie (2013); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2013); Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong
(2013); Kim et al. (2014a); Kosut et al. (2011); Ma et al. (2015); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Tan et al. (2015, 2014);
Wang et al. (2014); Xie et al. (2011)
(Unmanned) aerial systems Bezzo et al. (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon et al. (2014); Park et al. (2014); Shoukry et al. (2015b);
Xu and Zhu (2015)
(Unmanned) ground vehicles Bezzo et al. (2014); Pajic et al. (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Tiwari et al. (2014);
Xue et al. (2014)
Power grid only (with electricity market)
73 (52.9%)




Fig. 4: Distribution by application area
As we can see from Fig. 4, 73 (52.9%) out of 138
primary studies are focused exclusively on power grids.
Among those, as shown in Fig. 5, 47 papers (i.e. 39.8% of
all the selected studies) deal exclusively with power trans-
mission, 10 studies address the security aspects of the elec-
tricity market, 4 works are focused on power distribution,
3 papers on power generation, and the remaining 9 on any
combination of the previous ones.
The second largest group of publications in Fig. 4 counts
38 works, that is 27.5% of the whole set of primary studies












Fig. 5: Distribution in power grids
Building automation (e.g. HVAC)
Generic dynamical systems
Linear dynamical systems in power grids
Irrigation and water supply
(Unmanned) ground vehicles
(Unmanned) aerial systems







Fig. 6: Distribution of other applications
rity of generic linear dynamical systems, so the proposed
approaches can be used in any suitable application. How-
ever, these works do not provide examples of a particular
application.
The last group of the remaining 27 studies is detailed
in Fig. 6. These works are almost uniformly distributed
among the following applications: (unmanned) aerial sys-
tems (e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles, air traffic manage-
ment systems) and (unmanned) ground vehicles (UGV)
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Fig. 7: Distribution by point of view
Fig. 8: Distribution by security attributes
accounting for 7 and 6 of primary studies, respectively;
hydro-systems relying on automatic control considered in 5
papers; generic (linear and non linear) dynamical systems
and linear dynamical systems with applications to power
grids, both found in 4 studies. It is worth noting that
UGV-based systems deal with the navigation and control
of teleoperated and autonomous ground vehicles, together
with their supervisory control and vehicle platooning. Fi-
nally, the security of building automation applications is
investigated in one primary study.
From the collected data, we can offer the following ob-
servations:
• the bulk of the selected works on security for cyber-
physical systems is focused on power grids; this is not
surprising, and may be due to the fact that smart
grids are recognized as a driver for sustained eco-
nomic prosperity, quality of life, and global compet-
itiveness of a nation, attracting big research efforts
to this area as a whole; also, the models used in this
domain are well-known and the famous false data in-
jection attack (Liu et al., 2011) has been introduced
in the context of power networks, giving traction to
this kind of research applications. Moreover, the im-
pressive market growth in renewable energy devices
posed novel challenging problems in the design and
management of power grids: as a consequence, the
interest of energy providers on novel methods and
technologies for optimizing network management with
guaranteed performance, safety, and security pro-
vided a tremendous boost to academic research on
these topics;
• only a small part of the selected papers presents
the applications to the secure control of (unmanned)
ground vehicles and aerial systems, and of heating,
ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC), as well as
lighting and shading, in large functional buildings;
this application fields are relatively new for the ap-
proaches to the cyber-physical security, with the first
studies appearing only in 2012; this result can be
seen as indication of a potentially interesting direc-
tion for future research on CPS security;
• somehow surprisingly, from the automatic control
perspective we have not found any work focused on
the cyber-physical security of medical CPS (Lee and
Sokolsky, 2010) (since all the works on security we
found in this domain still rely only on the typical
IT security practices and do not consider the dy-
namics of physical phenomena of interest, and thus
were excluded by exclusion criteria E3, described in
Section 3.4). We suppose that the topics of physi-
ological close-loop control and patient modeling are
seen as not mature enough to consider the security
aspects specific to this important application field
from the control-theoretic point of view. In any case,
we expect that these topics will be considered and
addressed in the near future.
5.2. Point of view
As reported in Fig. 75, we distinguish primary stud-
ies based on whether they treat approaches for security
breaching (i.e. attack) or enforcing via some kind of coun-
termeasures (i.e. defense), or both. From our analysis it
emerged that 68 studies over 138 focus exclusively on the
various countermeasures that a CPS may put in place in
response to an attack, whereas 35 studies focus exclusively
on vulnerability analysis by proposing or improving an at-
tack scheme using an adversary’s point of view. They do
not study the topic of the risk treatment, which is peculiar
to the designer’s or operator’s perspective. The remaining
35 works treat both attack and defense strategies.
From this result we can observe that the defense strate-
gies are presented in most (103, i.e. 74.6%) of the selected
studies, occupying the central spot of the research efforts
on CPS security. A more detailed discussion of the vari-
ous defense strategies proposed in research is provided in
Section 5.16, while the mapping of primary studies by the
adopted point of view is detailed in Table 4.
5.3. Considered security attributes
Security can be seen as a composition of three main at-
tributes, namely confidentiality, integrity and availability
(Avižienis et al., 2004). Therefore, we have identified the
5We use area-proportional set diagrams (Micallef and Rodgers,
2014) for visualizing the distribution over parameters with multiple
values in which the discussion of their intersections is relevant for
this study.
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Table 4: Point of view.
Point of view Primary studies
Attack Amini et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang (2013); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Deka et al. (2015a,b); Djouadi et al. (2014); Esmalifalak
et al. (2012, 2011); Hammad et al. (2015a); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Kim et al. (2014b,a, 2015); Kontouras et al. (2015);
Kwon et al. (2014); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2015b, 2011); Mishra et al. (2015a); Mo and Sinopoli (2012); Qi et al. (2015);
Smith (2015); Tan et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2010, 2015a,b); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Xie et al. (2011); Yamaguchi et al.
(2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2015, 2014); Zhang and Sankar (2015)
Defense Amin et al. (2009); Anwar et al. (2015); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and
Speranzon (2013); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Do et al. (2015); Eyisi and
Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Gu et al. (2015); Hammad et al. (2015b); Hendrickx et al.
(2014); Huang et al. (2011); Jones et al. (2014); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Lee et al. (2015); Li
et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Li et al. (2015c); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015a); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014);
Miao et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2015); Mo et al. (2015); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Nudell
et al. (2015); Pajic et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2011); Rahman et al. (2014); Rawat and Bajracharya
(2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015a,b); Shoukry
and Tabuada (2014); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tajer et al. (2011); Talebi et al. (2012);
Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2012); Tiwari et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vuković et al. (2012); Wei and Kundur
(2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xu and Zhu (2015); Xue et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar
(2015); Zhu et al. (2013); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Both Amin et al. (2010); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bi and Zhang (2014); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Chen et al. (2015);
Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al. (2012); Deka et al. (2014); Esmalifalak et al. (2013); Giani et al. (2013); Gupta et al. (2010);
Hao et al. (2015); Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Li et al. (2015b); Liu et al.
(2014b,c); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Ozay et al. (2013); Pasqualetti et al.
(2013); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Sajjad et al. (2015); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Tan et al. (2014);
Vuković and Dán (2014); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Yang et al. (2014); Yuan
and Mo (2015)
security attributes considered by each primary study in
order to understand how those attributes have been inves-
tigated by researchers on CPS security. Fig. 8 shows the
distribution of the primary studies across confidentiality,
integrity, and availability, whilst Table 5 provides the map
of the main security attributes to the primary studies.
The first thing that strikes the eye is that 124, i.e. 89,9%,
of the works are concerned with CPS integrity, threat-
ened by various types of deception attacks. Some of these
works consider also the availability and/or confidentiality,
together with integrity. On the contrary, only two stud-
ies, Ma et al. (2015) and Liu et al. (2014c), focus on the
combination of solely availability and confidentiality ; those
papers apply game theory to the design of countermeasures
to intelligent jamming attacks, which have been published
between the fall 2014 and 2015. For further discussion of
security attributes, see Section 5.12.
5.4. System components
Each approach to security breaching or enforcing con-
siders a particular set of system components to be compro-
mised or protected. In our analysis we identified five main
categories for describing the main system components to
be compromised or protected, that are: sensors, actuators,
network, controllers, plant. As an example, false data in-
jection mainly targets a set of sensors, while load alter-
ing can attack a set of actuators. As for all deception
and some disruption attacks, we should “note that from
a practical point of view, an attack on a sensor could ei-
ther be interpreted as an attack on the node itself (making
it transmit an incorrect signal), or it could also be inter-
preted as an attack on the communication link between the












Fig. 9: Distribution of primary studies by system components
actuator could either be interpreted as an attack on the ac-
tuator itself, or on the communication link from the con-
troller to the actuator” (Fawzi et al., 2014). Thus, we say
that an approach considers a network either when it does
it implicitly by considering a denial-of-service (DoS) at-
tack on communication links, or explicitly, by exploiting
transmission scheduling, routing or some network-induced
imperfections. By the same line of reasoning, we say that
the work takes into account a controller when it proposes
a novel one, whereas the plant category comes into play
with attacks at the physical layer and with eavesdropping.
Fig. 9 presents how system components have been con-
sidered among the primary studies, while the Table 6 re-
ports the related mapping, showing that sensors were taken
into account 115 (83.3%) times, 69 (50.0%) times alone
and 32 (23,2%) times together with actuators. The actua-
tors themselves were considered 38 (27.5%) times, while
network was taken into account in 35 (25.4%) studies.
This data suggests that the approaches considering at-
tacks on sensors and their protection completely dominate
the scene. All the other system components have received
much less attention, with a slight predominance of actua-
tors and network.
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Table 5: Security attributes.
Security attribute Primary studies
Availability Amin et al. (2009); Barreto et al. (2013); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas et al. (2011);
Cetinkaya et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Eyisi and Koutsoukos
(2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b,a); Kim et al. (2014a); Li et al. (2015b,c);
Liu et al. (2014b,c); Ma et al. (2015); Mishra et al. (2015a); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Nudell et al. (2015);
Park et al. (2014); Qi et al. (2015); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a); Smith
(2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Vuković and Dán (2014); Xu and Zhu (2015); Zhang et al. (2015,
2014); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Confidentiality Amini et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Esmalifalak et al.
(2011); Gu et al. (2015); Jones et al. (2014); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Li et al. (2015b); Liu et al. (2014b,c); Ma et al.
(2015); Mishra et al. (2014); Mo et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Qi et al. (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry
et al. (2015a); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Weerakkody
and Sinopoli (2015); Xu and Zhu (2015); Xue et al. (2014); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2014); Zhu and Mart́ınez
(2014); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Integrity Amin et al. (2010); Amini et al. (2015); Anwar et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bezzo et al. (2015, 2014);
Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Chakhchoukh
and Ishii (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al. (2012); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); D’Innocenzo
et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Do et al. (2015); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014);
Fawzi et al. (2014); Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al. (2015); Gupta et al. (2010); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014);
Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al.
(2014b,a, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon
et al. (2014); Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Li et al. (2015b,c); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al.
(2014a,b, 2015a,b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao et al. (2014);
Mishra et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011);
Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pajic et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al.
(2011, 2013); Qi et al. (2015); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat and
Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Sedghi
and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015a,b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Sou et al. (2014);
Sundaram et al. (2010); Tajer et al. (2011); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2015, 2014); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira
et al. (2010, 2015a, 2012, 2015b); Tiwari et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Vuković and
Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Wei and
Kundur (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xie et al. (2011); Xu and Zhu (2015); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016,
2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2014); Zhang and Sankar (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014);
Zhu and Başar (2015); Zhu et al. (2013); Zonouz et al. (2012)
5.5. Plant model
We have seen in Section 5.1 that the application do-
main of research on CPS security is mainly divided be-
tween power grids and all the others. This result is re-
flected also in the choice of the mathematical models used
to describe the physical domain.
In particular, power transmission is traditionally stud-
ied via a power flow model, which is a set of equations
that depict the energy flow on each transmission line of a
power grid. An AC power flow model considers both real
and reactive power and is formulated by nonlinear equa-
tions, where the state variables are voltage magnitudes
and phase angles of the buses (Abur and Exposito, 2004;
Wood et al., 2013). However, SE using an AC power flow
model can be computationally expensive and does not al-
ways converge to a solution. Thus, power system engineers
sometimes use a linearized power flow model, DC power
flow model, to approximate the AC power flow model (Liu
et al., 2011). In DC power flow model the reactive power
is completely neglected and state variables only consist of
voltage phase angles of the buses. As of power generation,
the model based on equations describing the electrome-
chanical swing dynamics of the synchronous generators
(Kundur, 1994) is usually applied. In other application
domains more general linear time invariant (LTI) or non-
linear dynamical models are used.
Fig. 10 shows how the above mentioned models have
been used within the set of primary studies, whilst Table 7
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Fig. 10: Distribution of studies by plant model
has been used in 58 works (42.0% of whole set), while
the more complicated and realistic AC power flow model
(which is capable to capture more subtleties) has been
studied 18 (13.0%) times. In 8 (5.8%) studies both the AC
power flow model and its linear DC approximation have
been used. Other LTI models were applied in 67 (48.6%)
primary studies. Nonlinear dynamic and swing equation-
based models were applied 15 (10.9%) and 10 (7.2%) times,
respectively.
5.6. Process noise
To capture any deviation in the plant model from the
real dynamics of the controlled physical system, the pro-
cess noise is used. From the primary studies it emerged
that it can be categorized into three main classes: Gaus-
sian, bounded (non-stochastic), and noiseless.
The mapping of individual studies to process noise is
shown in Table 8, while the distribution of primary studies
by process noise is reported in Fig. 11, where the studies
considering the measurement model only (70, accounting
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Table 6: System components.
System component Primary studies
Actuators Amin et al. (2009, 2010); Amini et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013);
Deka et al. (2015a); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014);
Hammad et al. (2015a); Jones et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kwon and Hwang (2013b); Kwon et al. (2014); Li
et al. (2015c); Liu et al. (2014b); Miao and Zhu (2014); Mishra et al. (2014); Mo and Sinopoli (2012); Mo et al. (2015);
Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Pajic et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Rahman
et al. (2014); Rhouma et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a); Smith (2015); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2012, 2015b);
Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Zhang and Sankar (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu
and Başar (2015)
Controllers Amin et al. (2009); Befekadu et al. (2015); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b); Kogiso
and Fujita (2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013a); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013);
Teixeira et al. (2015a); Wei and Kundur (2015); Xu and Zhu (2015); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014);
Zhu and Başar (2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Network Amin et al. (2009); Barreto et al. (2013); Befekadu et al. (2015); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Deka
et al. (2015a); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez
(2013); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b); Jones et al. (2014); Li et al. (2015a,b,c); Liu et al. (2014c); Ma et al.
(2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Pajic et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Rawat and Bajracharya
(2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013); Soltan et al. (2015); Sundaram et al. (2010); Teixeira et al. (2015b);
Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Xu and Zhu (2015); Zhang et al. (2015, 2014); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014);
Zhu and Başar (2015)
Plant Sajjad et al. (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Xue et al. (2014);
Zhu et al. (2013)
Sensors Amin et al. (2009, 2010); Anwar et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo
et al. (2015, 2014); Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas et al.
(2011); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al. (2012); Deka et al. (2014,
2015b); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Do et al. (2015); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Eyisi
and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al. (2015); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al.
(2014); Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013);
Kim et al. (2014b,a, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon et al. (2014);
Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Li et al. (2015b,c); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a,
2015a,b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao et al.
(2014); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Nudell
et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pajic et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2011, 2013); Qi et al. (2015);
Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma
et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a,b);
Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tajer et al.
(2011); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2015, 2014); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2010, 2012, 2015b); Tiwari et al.
(2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren
(2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Wei and Kundur (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xie et al. (2011); Yamaguchi
et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2014); Zhang and Sankar
(2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Fig. 11: Distribution by process noise
for 50.7% of the whole set of selected papers) were not
included, since for them the facet of process noise is not
applicable. We can see that the noiseless and Gaussian
process noise models are the most used ones (accounted
36 and 30 times, respectively). As shown in Fig. 12, the
bounded non-stochastic model (used 9 times) is starting
to receive a growing attention in the very last years.
Fig. 12: Number of studies with bounded process noise year by year
5.7. Measurement noise
Depending on the assumptions on the noise, sensor
measurement models can be broadly categorized into three
classes: Gaussian, bounded (non-stochastic) and noiseless
(Mishra et al., 2015b). As shown in Fig. 13, the majority
of primary studies (89, i.e. 64.5%) uses Gaussian measure-
ment noise model; while 41 (29.7% of all) works assume
noiseless measurements. Only 10 works have used bounded
(non-stochastic) assumptions. Similarly for the bounded
process noise, the bounded measurement noise has started
to gain attention only recently in the CPS security domain,
as we can see from Fig. 14.
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Table 7: Plant models.
Plant model Primary studies
AC power flow Anwar et al. (2015); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Davis et al. (2012); Gu et al. (2015); Hug and Giampapa
(2012); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014b, 2015); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2015a); Manandhar
et al. (2014); Qin et al. (2013); Sou et al. (2014); Teixeira et al. (2010); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Wang et al.
(2014); Zhang and Sankar (2015); Zonouz et al. (2012)
DC approximation of power flow Amini et al. (2015); Anwar et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Chakhchoukh and
Ishii (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Giani
et al. (2013); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia
et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014a, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Li
et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015);
Mishra et al. (2015a); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Ozay et al. (2013); Pasqualetti et al. (2011,
2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Sanandaji
et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014);
Tajer et al. (2011); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2015, 2014); Teixeira et al. (2010); Vuković and Dán (2014);
Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Xie et al. (2011); Yamaguchi et al. (2014);
Yang et al. (2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012)
Linear time-invariant (LTI) Amin et al. (2009, 2010); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2014);
Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); De Persis
and Tesi (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Do et al. (2015); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014);
Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b,a); Jones et al.
(2014); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon et al. (2014);
Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015b,c); Liu et al. (2014b,c); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao
et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Naghnaeian et al.
(2015); Pajic et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Qi et al. (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015);
Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Sundaram
et al. (2010); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015a, 2012, 2015b); Tiwari et al. (2014); Weerakkody and
Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xu and Zhu (2015); Xue et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016); Yuan and Mo
(2015); Zhang et al. (2015, 2014); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Nonlinear dynamical system Bezzo et al. (2015); Hammad et al. (2015a); Jones et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014b); Manandhar et al. (2014);
Mo and Sinopoli (2015); Park et al. (2014); Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a,b); Smith (2015);
Teixeira et al. (2012); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Yang et al. (2016); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Swing equations-based Amini et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Hammad et al. (2015b,a); Liu et al. (2014b);
Nudell et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Wei and Kundur (2015); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Fig. 13: Distribution by measurement noise
The mapping of individual studies to measurement noise
is reported in Table 9. If a study does not consider the
measurement model (e.g., when the work is not related to
the secure state estimation against sensor attacks), we say
that the measurement noise is not applicable. Among the
selected primary studies there were 13 such studies.
5.8. State estimation
For many situations, it may be unrealistic or unfeasible
to assume that all the states of the system are measured.
In fact, 99 studies were using some kind of state estima-
tion, which corresponds to 71.7% of all the primary studies
(see Fig. 15). The most used SE method is weighted least
squares (WLS), found in 59 (42.8% of all) works (inter-
estingly, all 59 studies were related to power grids). The
Fig. 14: Number of studies with bounded measurement noise year
by year
WLS method for power system SE is optimal under Gaus-
sian measurement noise (Chakhchoukh and Ishii, 2015)
and, in case of DC approximation of power flow, leads to
an estimator identical to the one obtained with maximum
likelihood or with minimum variance methods (Liu et al.,
2011). The (extended) Kalman filter was used in 25 stud-
ies (18.1% of all primary studies), while the (extended)
Luenberger observer was used in 13 studies (9.4%), the
H∞ filter in 2 studies and the least trimmed squares esti-
mator in only one study. Novel solutions for the SE were
proposed in 16 (11.6%) studies. The mapping of individual
primary studies to SE methods is reported in Table 10.
Novel methods range from application-specific solutions
(Amin et al., 2010; Wei and Kundur, 2015) and distributed
state estimation techniques for power networks (Pasqualetti
et al., 2011; Tajer et al., 2011; Ozay et al., 2013) to generic
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Table 8: Process noise.
Process noise Primary studies
Bounded (non-stochastic) De Persis and Tesi (2015); Gupta et al. (2010); Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015c); Pajic et al. (2015); Shoukry et al.
(2013); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Xu and Zhu (2015); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Gaussian Amin et al. (2009); Bai et al. (2015); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2014); Do et al. (2015); Gupta et al. (2010);
Jones et al. (2014); Kwon et al. (2014); Li et al. (2015b,c); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao
et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012); Mo et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Qi et al. (2015);
Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Smith (2015); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b);
Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2015,
2014); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Noiseless Amin et al. (2010); Amini et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bezzo et al. (2015); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013);
Cárdenas et al. (2011); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al.
(2014); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Hammad et al. (2015b,a);
Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Liu et al. (2014b,c); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015b); Naghnaeian
et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014);
Smith (2015); Sundaram et al. (2010); Teixeira et al. (2015a, 2012); Tiwari et al. (2014); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015);
Xue et al. (2014); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu et al. (2013)
Table 9: Measurement noise.
Measurement noise Primary studies
Bounded (non-stochastic) Bezzo et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015c); Mo and Sinopoli (2015); Pajic
et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013); Tajer et al. (2011); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Wei and Kundur (2015)
Gaussian Anwar et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2014); Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba
et al. (2010); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Do et al. (2015);
Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al. (2015); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014);
Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim
et al. (2014b,a, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon et al. (2014); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang
(2014); Li et al. (2015b,c); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015a,b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al.
(2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2015a,b); Mo and Sinopoli
(2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2011); Qi et al. (2015); Qin
et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma
et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a);
Smith (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Tajer et al. (2011); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2014); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira
et al. (2010, 2015b); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014);
Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xie et al. (2011); Xue et al. (2014); Yamaguchi et al. (2014);
Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2015, 2014);
Zhang and Sankar (2015); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Noiseless Amin et al. (2009, 2010); Amini et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas
et al. (2011); Chen et al. (2015); Davis et al. (2012); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Deka et al. (2015a); D’Innocenzo
et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013);
Giani et al. (2013); Hammad et al. (2015a); Kim and Tong (2013); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Liang et al. (2014);
Liu et al. (2014b,c, 2015b); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015b); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Nudell et al. (2015);
Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015);
Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Talebi et al. (2012); Teixeira et al. (2012); Tiwari et al. (2014); Zhu and
Başar (2015); Zhu et al. (2013)













Fig. 15: Distribution of primary studies by state estimation
attack-resilient solutions inspired by Kalman filter (Bezzo
et al., 2014; Mishra et al., 2015b).
Within the domain of power grids, Giani et al. (2013)
proposed SE based countermeasures to coordinated sparse
attacks on power meter readings, that take advantage of
graph-theoretic construct of observable islands, which are
disjoint subsets of buses sharing the same perceived change
of state [voltage phase] under the attack. As a coun-
termeasure to leverage point attacks against WLS SE in
smart grid, Tan et al. (2014) introduced a modified robust
Schweppe-Huber Generalized-M estimator. The WLS es-
timation method for power networks has been extended by
Liu et al. (2015a) by merging cyber impact factor matrix
into the state estimation as a reasonable adjustment of
the weight values, in order to create the abnormal traffic-
indexed SE.
Regarding generic CPS, to estimate the state of the
plant despite attacks on sensors and actuators, Fawzi et al.
(2014) proposed an efficient state reconstructor inspired
from techniques used in compressed sensing and error cor-
rection over the real numbers. Pajic et al. (2014) showed
that implementation issues such as jitter, latency and syn-
chronization errors can be mapped into parameters of the
SE procedure that describe modeling errors, and provides
a bound on the SE error caused by modeling errors. The
same research line is extended in Pajic et al. (2015) to
prove that for linear dynamical systems with bounded pro-
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Table 10: State estimation.
State estimators Primary studies
(Extended) Kalman filter Amin et al. (2009); Bai et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015, 2014); Do et al. (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013a);
Kwon et al. (2014); Li et al. (2015b); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao et al. (2014);
Mishra et al. (2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012); Mo et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2013);
Qi et al. (2015); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Weerakkody
and Sinopoli (2015); Yang et al. (2016); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2015, 2014)
(Extended) Luenberger observer Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014);
Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Kwon and Hwang (2013b); Lee et al. (2015); Liu et al. (2014b); Mishra et al.
(2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Tang et al. (2015); Zhu and Başar (2015)
H∞ filter Kwon and Hwang (2013a); Shoukry et al. (2013)
Least trimmed squares (LTS) Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015)
Maximum likelihood Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Choi and Xie (2013); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Esmalifalak
et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Giani et al. (2013); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Huang et al. (2011);
Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014a); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Li et al.
(2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Mishra
et al. (2015a); Ozay et al. (2013); Pasqualetti et al. (2011); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad
(2012); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Talebi et al. (2012);
Tan et al. (2014); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang and Ren (2014); Xie et al. (2011);
Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012)
Minimum variance Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Choi and Xie (2013); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Esmalifalak
et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Giani et al. (2013); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Huang et al. (2011);
Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014a); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Li et al.
(2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Mishra
et al. (2015a); Ozay et al. (2013); Pasqualetti et al. (2011); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad
(2012); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Talebi et al. (2012);
Tan et al. (2014); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang and Ren (2014); Weimer et al. (2014);
Xie et al. (2011); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012)
Novel Amin et al. (2010); Bezzo et al. (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Giani et al. (2013); Liu et al. (2015a); Mishra et al.
(2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pajic et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2011); Shoukry
et al. (2015b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Tajer et al. (2011); Tan et al. (2014); Wei and Kundur (2015);
Weimer et al. (2014)
Weighted least-square (WLS) Anwar et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Choi and
Xie (2013); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al.
(2015); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al.
(2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014b,a, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Li et al.
(2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015a,b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013);
Ma et al. (2015); Mishra et al. (2015a); Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pasqualetti et al. (2011); Qin
et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and
Saad (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2014); Teixeira
et al. (2010); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Xie
et al. (2011); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Zhang and
Sankar (2015); Zonouz et al. (2012)
cess and measurement noise, the worst-case error is linear
with the size of the noise, meaning that an attacker cannot
exploit noise and modeling errors to introduce unbounded
SE errors in the proposed state estimator based on `0 and
`1 norms.
Mo and Sinopoli (2015) constructed an optimal estima-
tor of a scalar state that minimizes the “worst-case” ex-
pected cost against all possible manipulations of measure-
ments by the attacker, while Weimer et al. (2014) intro-
duced a minimum mean-squared error resilient (MMSE-R)
estimator for stochastic systems, whose conditional mean
squared error from the state remains finitely bounded and
is independent of additive measurement attacks.
Finally, for linear dynamical systems under sensor at-
tacks, Shoukry and Tabuada (2014) presented an efficient
event-triggered projected Luenberger observer for systems
under sparse attacks, and Shoukry et al. (2015), Shoukry
et al. (2015b) developed an efficient algorithm that uses
a Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) approach to isolate
the compromised sensors and estimate the system state
despite the presence of the attack.
Together, these results are an indication that the re-
silient SE under measurement attacks is a very active re-
search topic within the area of CPS security, making us
reasonably confident about its future development and po-
tential.
5.9. Anomaly detector
Current state estimation algorithms use bad data de-
tection (BDD) schemes to detect random outliers in the
measurement data (Teixeira et al., 2010). Two of the
most used BDD hypothesis tests are the performance index
test (also known in power system’s community as J(x̂)-
test or χ2-test) and the largest normalized residual test
(often referred as rNmax-test) (Abur and Exposito, 2004).
As shown in Fig. 16, among our primary studies there
are 62 approaches considering performance index test, 23
approaches dealing with normalized residual test, and 14
considering both aforementioned hypothesis tests. The
mapping of primary studies by the adopted state estima-
tion algorithms is detailed in Table 11, which shows that
9 studies consider an arbitrary anomaly detector imple-
mented by the controller and deployed to detect possible
deviations from the nominal behavior, while 43 (31.2%)
primary studies do not deal at all with anomaly detection.
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Fig. 16: Distribution of primary studies by anomaly detection
In an effort to minimize the detection delay, the change
detection can be formulated as a quickest detection prob-
lem. Page’s cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm is the
best-known technique to tackle this type of problem. There
are 6 selected primary studies, that propose or use a
CUSUM-based attack detection schemes (Cárdenas et al.,
2011; Huang et al., 2011; Yang et al., 2014, 2016; Do et al.,
2015; Li et al., 2015a). There are also 28 (20.3%) studies
that propose other novel anomaly detection approaches,
some of which are considered together with the perfor-
mance index test and/or normalized residual test. The
novel solutions for bad data detection cover the topics
of distributed monitoring (Pasqualetti et al., 2011, 2013;
Tajer et al., 2011; Vuković and Dán, 2014) and application-
specific anomaly detection for multi-agent distributed flock-
ing formation control (Wei and Kundur, 2015), automated
cascade canal irrigation systems (Amin et al., 2010), wire-
less control networks, “where the network itself acts as the
controller, instead of having a specially designated node
performing this task” (Sundaram et al., 2010), multi-hop
control networks, “where the communication between sen-
sors, actuators and computational units is supported by a
(wireless) multi-hop communication network and data flow
is performed using scheduling, routing and network coding
of sensing and actuation data” (D’Innocenzo et al., 2015),
air transportation systems (Park et al., 2014), and vehicle
platooning (Sajjad et al., 2015).
In the power system domain, Kosut et al. (2011) pro-
poses a generalized likelihood ratio detector, that incor-
porates historical data and does not compute explicitly
the residue error, while Gu et al. (2015) introduces a new
method to detect false data injection attacks against AC
state estimation by tracking the dynamics of measurement
variations: the Kullback–Leibler distance (KL divergence,
known also as relative entropy) is used to calculate the dis-
tance between two probability distributions derived from
measurement variations.
The KL divergence is adopted also by Mo et al. (2015),
Weerakkody et al. (2014)6 in designing the optimal water-
mark signal in the class of stationary Gaussian processes,
6This work was extended by Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015).
which is used to derive the optimal Neyman–Pearson de-
tector of replay and covert attacks, respectively.
Valenzuela et al. (2013) use principal component anal-
ysis (PCA) to separate power flow variability into regular
and irregular subspaces, with the analysis of the infor-
mation in the irregular subspace determining whether the
power system data has been compromised. Also Liu et al.
(2014a) views false data detection as matrix separation
problem and, differently from the case of the PCA, pro-
poses algorithms that exploit “the low rank structure of
the anomaly-free measurement matrix, and the fact that
malicious attacks are quite sparse.”
Tiwari et al. (2014) propose an approach inspired by
PCA, that uses an invariant “– an over-approximation of
the reachable states – of the system under normal condi-
tions as the classifier”; this set is called the safety enve-
lope. An alarm is raised whenever the system state falls
outside the safety envelope.
Security-oriented cyber-physical state estimation
(SCPSE) for power grid, proposed in Zonouz et al. (2012),
uses stochastic information fusion algorithms on “infor-
mation provided by alerts from intrusion detection systems
that monitor the cyber infrastructure for malicious or ab-
normal activity, in conjunction with knowledge about the
communication network topology and the output of a tra-
ditional state estimator”, in order to detect intrusions and
malicious data, and to assess the cyber-physical system
state.
Other novel anomaly detection methods in power grid
comprise a detector implementing the Euclidean distance
metric (Manandhar et al., 2014), and a cosine similarity
matching based approach (Rawat and Bajracharya, 2015).
It is worth noting that the second one requires the usage of
the Kalman filter as a source of estimated/expected data.
To contrast false data injection attacks, Sedghi and
Jonckheere (2015) presented a decentralized detection and
isolation scheme based on the Markov graph of the bus
phase angles, obtained via conditional mutual information
threshold (CMIT) test, while Sou et al. (2014) introduced
a scheme, that considers potentially compromised infor-
mation from both the active and the reactive power mea-
surements on transmission lines. In this second scheme,
based on the novel reactive power measurement residual,
“the component of the proposed residual on any particu-
lar line depends only locally on the component of the data
attack on the same line”. Li and Wang (2014) presented
the state summation detection using state variables’ dis-
tributions, which tests hypothesis on true measurement
square sum Sx (assumed to follow normal distribution,
given a large number of state variables) together with test
on J(x̂). Sanandaji et al. (2014) introduced a heuristic for
detecting abrupt changes in the system outputs based on
the singular value decomposition of a history matrix built
from system observations. To detect the presence of a re-
play attack without injecting authentication noise to the
control signal in networked control systems (NCS) involv-
ing additive white Gaussian noise channels, Tang et al.
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Table 11: Bad data detection.
Anomaly detector Primary studies
Arbitrary Bai et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Giani et al. (2013); Lee et al. (2015); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Nudell
et al. (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b)
Largest normalised residual test Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Davis et al. (2012); Esmalifalak et al. (2012); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al.
(2014); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Kim et al. (2014b); Kosut et al. (2011); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014);
Ma et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Shoukry et al. (2015b); Sou et al. (2014); Talebi et al. (2012); Teixeira
et al. (2010, 2015b); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang and Ren (2014); Weerakkody and
Sinopoli (2015); Yang et al. (2014); Yu and Chin (2015)
Novel Amin et al. (2010); Cárdenas et al. (2011); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Do et al. (2015); Eyisi and Koutsoukos
(2014); Gu et al. (2015); Huang et al. (2011); Jones et al. (2014); Kosut et al. (2011); Li et al. (2015a); Li and
Wang (2014); Li et al. (2015c); Liu et al. (2014a); Manandhar et al. (2014); Mo et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014);
Pasqualetti et al. (2011, 2013); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014);
Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tajer et al. (2011); Tang et al. (2015);
Tiwari et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vuković and Dán (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Wei
and Kundur (2015); Yang et al. (2016); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Performance index test Anwar et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Choi and
Xie (2013); Davis et al. (2012); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Giani et al.
(2013); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al.
(2014b,a, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon et al. (2014); Li and Wang (2014); Liang et al.
(2014); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015a,b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao
and Zhu (2014); Miao et al. (2014); Mo and Sinopoli (2012); Mo et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Park et al.
(2014); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat and Bajracharya
(2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Shoukry et al. (2015a); Sou et al. (2014); Talebi et al.
(2012); Tan et al. (2014); Teixeira et al. (2010, 2012, 2015b); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang
and Ren (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xie et al. (2011); Yamaguchi et al.
(2014); Yang et al. (2014); Yuan et al. (2012); Zhang and Sankar (2015)
(2015) presented a hypothesis test based on spectral es-
timation techniques. For dissipative or passive CPS, Ey-
isi and Koutsoukos (2014) proposed energy-based attack
detection monitor. To contrast stochastic cyber-attacks,
Li et al. (2015c) presented an algebraic detection scheme
based on the frequency-domain transformation technique
and linear algebra theory, together with sufficient and nec-
essary conditions guaranteeing the detectability of such
attacks. Finally, Jones et al. (2014) presents an auto-
mated anomaly detection mechanism based on inference
via formal methods to develop an unsupervised learning
algorithm, which constructs from data a signal temporal
logic (STL) formula that describes normal system behav-
ior. Trajectories that do not satisfy the learned formula
are flagged as anomalous.
As a general comment, the literature described in this
section appears quite fragmented, and a systematic high
level view is still missing even within a specific applica-
tion domain. The different results and methodologies are
very difficult to relate each other and validate since both
a comparison metric and a benchmark, neither academic
nor industrial, have not been agreed and defined yet.
5.10. Controller
Considering the used controller, the first fact emerging
from our analysis is that studies focusing on state estima-
tion usually do not examine at all the controller. So in 91
(65.9% of 138 selected) studies the controller is not avail-
able. In the remainder of this section we will focus on the
remaining 47 studies, some of which consider more than
one controller at once.
As shown in Fig. 17, the most considered controllers
are generic state feedback or output feedback controllers


















Fig. 17: Distribution of primary studies by controller
found in 16 (i.e. 11.6% of all) studies, together with linear
quadratic regulators (LQR) and novel controllers, seen in
13 and 12 works, respectively. Variations of proportional-
integral-derivative (PID) controller are found in 7 primary
studies, while both the event-triggered and self-triggered
controllers, and the H∞ (minimax) controllers are consid-
ered by 5 works, whilst sliding mode and other types of
controllers are deployed in 3 papers. Table 12 provides
the related mapping.
The “other” control schemes not listed explicitly in Ta-
ble 12 were used in cloud-enabled NCS and in intercon-
nected microgrids, as well as in more generic CPS. Specif-
ically, Xu and Zhu (2015) proposed a control design for
cloud-enabled NCS, where the controller encrypts data via
a randomized transformation, prior to the computation
of the contro law in the cloud, and verifies the solutions
from the cloud. The presented controller has three op-
erational modes, with the switching mechanism between
event-triggered model predictive controller, buffer mode
and H∞ controller. Teixeira et al. (2015a) instead stud-
ied the impact of adversarial actions on voltage control
schemes in interconnected microgrids. It presented two at-
tack scenarios where the adversary corrupts measurement
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data and reference signals received by the voltage droop
controllers. Considering sampled-data nature of controlled
CPS consisting of the continuous physical dynamics and
the digital controllers, Naghnaeian et al. (2015) showed
that dual rate control is sufficient to remove all the vul-
nerabilities to stealthy actuator attacks, and that if a sin-
gle measurement output remains secure, and if the modes
of the system are observable from this output, then dual
rate systems always provide the ability to detect combined
sensor-actuator attacks.
For what concerns the novel controllers, inspired by
the analogy to flocking behavior, Wei and Kundur (2015)
developed distributed hierarchical “control methodologies
that leverage cooperation between distributed energy resources
and traditional synchronous machines to maintain tran-
sient stability in the face of severe disturbances”. For a
class of DoS attack models, Amin et al. (2009) presented
an optimal minimax causal feedback control law, subject
to the power, safety and security constraints. Then, Gupta
et al. (2010) studied a similar problem of optimal mini-
max control in the presence of an intelligent jammer with
limited actions as dynamic zero-sum game between the
jammer and the controller. Befekadu et al. (2015) intro-
duced instead the “measure transformation technique un-
der which the observation and state variables become mutu-
ally independent along the sample-path (or path-estimation)
of the DoS attack sequences in the system”, thanks to
which it derived the optimal control policy for the risk-
sensitive control problem, under a Markov modulated DoS
attack model. Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014) proposed a vari-
ation of the receding-horizon control law to deal with the
replay attacks, while Zhu et al. (2013) provided a set of
coupled Riccati differential equations characterizing feed-
back Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for the dis-
tributed control in the multi-agent system environment
subject to cyber attacks and malicious behaviors of phys-
ical agents. Kwon and Hwang (2013a) proposed “a hybrid
robust control scheme that considers multiple sub-controllers,
each matched to a specific type of cyber attacks”, together
with a method for designing the corresponding secure switch-
ing logic. For an efficient transient frequency and phase
stabilization in the power grid, Hammad et al. (2015b)
proposed the combined centralized-decentralized paramet-
ric feedback linearization controller which is resilient to
large communication delays and denial-of-service (DoS) at-
tacks. Cetinkaya et al. (2015) instead presented a numeri-
cal method for designing an event-triggered state-feedback
control that guarantees almost sure asymptotic stabiliza-
tion of NCS subject to (simultaneous) malicious jamming
attacks and random packet-losses modeled by a binary-
valued time-inhomogeneous Markov chain. Yuan and Mo
(2015) provided necessary and a sufficient conditions under
which an adversary can successfully identify the system
model by using only its disclosure resources (presenting
also the similarities with the known-plaintext attack from
the information security literature) and designed a coun-
termeasure by using a low-rank controller design strategy
Synchronization errors
Limited bandwidth















Fig. 18: Distribution by communication aspects and network-
induced imperfections
while trading off the linear quadratic Gaussian control per-
formance. In order to conceal several informations (such as
controller and plant model parameters, measurements and
control commands) processed inside the controller device,
Kogiso and Fujita (2015) proposed a concept of encrypt-
ing a linear controller using the homomorphic encryptions,
in a way that the encrypted controller need not to keep
any private keys for calculating the control input, which
means that the decryption process is not required inside
the controller. Lastly, Kontouras et al. (2015) examined a
constrained multivariable dynamical system, where a con-
tractive controller and a covert attacker take turns in af-
fecting the control input. It presented an adversary control
scheme based on an expanding controller that steers and
keeps the state vector outside the desired operation do-
main, while always respecting the alarm constraints. The
proposed control scheme allows the attacker relinquish its
authority over the control input according to a switching
logic, in order to achieve the main task with a limited use
of the available disruption resources.
As a general comment, the literature described in this
section derives interesting theoretical results, but there is
still a lot of work to do for addressing the practical chal-
lenges in CPS security.
5.11. Communication aspects and network-induced imper-
fections
The introduction of the communication network in a
control loop modifies the external signals of the plant and
the controller due to the network-induced imperfections
(Levine, 2010), which in turn depend on some communica-
tion aspects, such as transmission scheduling and routing.
When analyzing the primary studies on the basis of
this facet we got a surprise: 119 studies (i.e. 86.2%) do
not explicitly consider any communication aspect or im-
perfection, while only 7 studies (i.e. 5.1%) address more
than one aspect. The total number of times each commu-
nication aspect was addressed within the set of the primary
studies is shown in Fig. 18, whilst the related mapping is
reported in Table 13.
Synchronization errors are considered only by Pajic
et al. (2014) (which is part of the research line of Pajic




Event-triggered and self-triggered Cetinkaya et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Shoukry and Tabuada
(2014); Xu and Zhu (2015)
Linear-quadratic regulator Barreto et al. (2013); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Kwon and Hwang (2013a); Liu et al.
(2014c); Miao and Zhu (2014); Mo and Sinopoli (2012); Mo et al. (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Teixeira
et al. (2015b); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2015)
Linear time-invariant feedback Barreto et al. (2013); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Eyisi and Koutsoukos
(2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013b); Liu et al. (2014c); Miao and
Zhu (2014); Mishra et al. (2014); Pajic et al. (2015); Smith (2015); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b);
Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Xue et al. (2014)
H∞ (minimax) Kwon and Hwang (2013a); Shoukry et al. (2013); Smith (2015); Xu and Zhu (2015); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Novel Amin et al. (2009); Befekadu et al. (2015); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al.
(2015b); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013a); Wei and Kundur
(2015); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu et al. (2013)
Other Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015a); Xu and Zhu (2015)
Proportional-integral-derivative Amin et al. (2010); Amini et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Eyisi and Koutsoukos
(2014); Sajjad et al. (2015); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015)
Sliding mode Hammad et al. (2015a); Liu et al. (2014b); Sajjad et al. (2015)
sampling are mapped into parameters of the state esti-
mation procedure that describe modeling errors. Time-
varying sampling is taken into account also by Li et al.
(2015a) and, together with transmission scheduling, by De
Persis and Tesi (2015). Limited bandwidth is considered
together with error control coding by Gupta et al. (2011)
(which is related to Gupta et al. (2010)), and by Sundaram
et al. (2010), in which “nodes in a network transmit lin-
ear combinations of incoming packets rather than simply
routing them”. Packet losses and disorder were taken into
consideration only together with transmission scheduling,
by Cetinkaya et al. (2015) and by Shoukry et al. (2013).
Noticeably, Shoukry et al. (2013) took into account also
the variable latency. Only the variable latency was con-
sidered by Miao and Zhu (2014) and by Jones et al. (2014).
Routing by itself is examined by Vuković et al. (2012), and
together with error control coding, transmission schedul-
ing and variable latency, by D’Innocenzo et al. (2015). The
error control coding and transmission scheduling by them-
selves were taken into account in 3 (Fawzi et al., 2014; Miao
et al., 2014; Mishra et al., 2014) and 5 works (Foroush and
Mart́ınez, 2013; Zhang et al., 2014, 2015; Li et al., 2015b;
Qi et al., 2015), respectively.
Surprisingly, very few papers (attempt to) provide non-
trivial mathematical models of the communication proto-
col, which indeed is a fundamental actor of almost any
CPS. In particular, only in D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) a
specific standard for communication, i.e. WirelessHART
and ISA-100, is explicitly considered in the CPS mathe-
matical model.
5.12. Attacks and their characteristics
Regardless of the adopted point of view (see Section 5.2),
every study on CPS security deals with attacks in order
to either implement or to counteract them. Each attack
threats one or more primary security attributes (see Sec-
tion 5.3). More specifically, the best known attack on avail-
ability is the denial of service (DoS) attack, that renders
inaccessible some or all the components of a control system
by preventing transmissions of sensor or/and control data
over the network. “To launch a DoS an adversary can
jam the communication channels, compromise devices and
prevent them from sending data, attack the routing proto-
cols, flood with network traffic some devices, etc.” (Amin
et al., 2009). Attacks on data integrity are known as de-
ception attacks and represent the largest class of attacks
on cyber-physical systems, including false data injection
attacks. The attacks on confidentiality alone are often re-
ferred to as disclosure attacks, i.e. eavesdropping, which is
discussed only in six studies, as reported in Table 14.
Fig. 19 shows the distribution of attacks within the set
of our primary studies. The false data injection, together
with generic deception and DoS, with 58, 41 and 23 occur-
rences respectively, are considered in 108 (78.3%) primary
studies, while the bias injection, the packet scheduling,
and the variable structure switching attacks are consid-
ered only once and twice, respectively.
Characterization of the attacks. Generally speak-
ing, an attack on control systems can be characterized by
the amount of available resources and knowledge (Teixeira
et al., 2015b). The resources of an adversary can be split in
disclosure resources, which enable her to obtain sensitive
information about the system during the attack by vio-
lating data confidentiality, and disruption resources, that
affect the system operation by compromising the integrity
and/or availability. The amount of a priori knowledge re-
garding the control system is another core component of
the adversary model, as it may be used, for instance, to
render the attack undetectable. In the rest of Section 5.12
we describe the characteristics of each type of attack indi-
vidually.
In the bias injection attack, considered only by Teix-
eira et al. (2015b), the adversary’s goal is to inject a con-
21
Table 13: Communication aspects and network-induced imperfections.
Communication aspects Primary studies
Error control coding D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Fawzi et al. (2014); Gupta et al. (2010); Miao et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2014); Sundaram
et al. (2010)
Limited bandwidth Gupta et al. (2010); Sundaram et al. (2010)
Packet loses and desorder Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013)
Routing D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Sundaram et al. (2010); Vuković et al. (2012)
Synchronization errors Pajic et al. (2015)
Time-varying sampling De Persis and Tesi (2015); Li et al. (2015a); Pajic et al. (2015)
Transmission Scheduling Cetinkaya et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Li et al.
(2015b); Qi et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013); Zhang et al. (2015, 2014)
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Fig. 19: Distribution of attacks considered by primary studies
stant bias in the system without being detected. No dis-
closure capabilities are required for this attack, since the
attack policy is open-loop. The data corruptions may
be added to both the actuator and sensor data, and the
amount of disruption resources should be above the thresh-
old of undetectability7. Furthermore, the open-loop attack
policy requires an extensive knowledge of the parameters
of the considered closed-loop system and anomaly detec-
tor.
In the coordinated variable structure switching at-
tack and its extension to multi-switch and resonance at-
tack, considered in the works of Liu et al. (2014b) and
in the work of Hammad et al. (2015a), an opponent con-
trols multiple circuit breakers within a power system, and
employs a local model of the system and local state in-
formation (i.e. some knowledge of the target generator
states, which are rotor angle and frequency) to design a
7In other words, the attacker should have enough resources to
construct an unobservable attack; a good example of the amount
of disruption resources above the threshold of undetectability in the
context of power transmission networks is given by the security in-
dex (Sandberg et al., 2010), defined as minimum number of measure-
ments an attacker needs to compromise, in order to attack measure-
ment k without being detected.
state-dependent breaker switching sequence, that destabi-
lizes target synchronous generators.
The attack on the scheduling algorithm influences the
temporal characteristics of the network, as “it results in
time-varying delays and data packets possibly received out-
of-order” (Shoukry et al., 2013). To remain stealthy, the
attacker is not able to delay the packets beyond a maxi-
mum allowable delay consistent with the network protocol
in place. On the system level, this attack does not re-
quire any a priori knowledge of the system model, nor any
disclosure resources.
The false data injection is a specific deception attack
on state estimation, introduced in the context of electric
power grids by Liu et al. (2011). This attack on cyber-
physical systems is the most studied one. To perform it,
an adversary with some knowledge of the system topo-
logical information manipulates sensor measurements in
order to change the state variables, while bypassing ex-
isting bad data detection schemes. This attack is based
on the open-loop policy and does not require any disclo-
sure resources. To construct the attack vectors, a common
assumption in most works on false data injection attacks
on power system state estimation is that the attacker has
complete knowledge about the power grid topology and
transmission-line admittances. This information is ab-
stracted in the Jacobian matrix H (Huang et al., 2012;
Abur and Exposito, 2004), known also as measurement or
(power network) topology matrix. By contrast, Teixeira
et al. (2010) assumes the attacker only possesses a per-
turbed model of the power system, “such a model may
correspond to a partial model of the true system, or even
an out-dated model” (Teixeira et al., 2010). In this way it
quantifies a trade-off between the accuracy of the model
known by adversary and possible attack impact for differ-
ent BDD schemes, showing that “the more accurate model
the attacker has access to, the larger deception attack he
can perform undetected” (Teixeira et al., 2010). Similarly,
Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012) argues that “a realis-
tic false data injection attack is essentially an attack with
incomplete information due to the attackers lack of real-
time knowledge with respect to various grid parameters and
attributes such as the position of circuit breaker switches
and transformer tap changers and also because of the at-
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Table 14: Attacks.
Attack name Primary studies
Attack at physical layer Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a); Soltan et al. (2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Bias injection attack Teixeira et al. (2015b)
Covert attack Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Do et al. (2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Lee et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al.
(2013); Smith (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015)
Data Framing attack Deka et al. (2015b); Kim et al. (2014b, 2015)
Denial of Service (DoS) attack Amin et al. (2009); Barreto et al. (2013); Befekadu et al. (2015); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi
(2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Gupta et al. (2010);
Hammad et al. (2015b); Li et al. (2015b,c); Liu et al. (2014c); Ma et al. (2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Park
et al. (2014); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Xu and Zhu (2015);
Zhang et al. (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Eavesdropping Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Xu and Zhu (2015); Xue et al. (2014);
Yuan and Mo (2015)
False Data Injection attack Anwar et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang (2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al.
(2012); Deka et al. (2014); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al. (2015); Hao et al.
(2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Kim et al. (2014a, 2015); Kim
and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a,
2015a, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2015b); Mo and
Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pasqualetti et al. (2011, 2013); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014);
Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad
(2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015b); Sou et al. (2014); Tajer et al. (2011); Talebi et al.
(2012); Teixeira et al. (2010, 2015b); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Weimer
et al. (2014); Xie et al. (2011); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Zonouz
et al. (2012)
Generic deception attack Amin et al. (2010); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bezzo et al. (2015, 2014); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Chen
et al. (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Do et al. (2015); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014);
Fawzi et al. (2014); Gupta et al. (2010); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon
et al. (2014); Li et al. (2015b,c); Miao and Zhu (2014); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015a); Mo and Sinopoli (2012);
Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Nudell et al. (2015); Pajic et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2013);
Qi et al. (2015); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tan et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015a);
Tiwari et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Vuković and Dán (2014); Wei and Kundur
(2015); Xu and Zhu (2015); Zhang et al. (2014)
Leverage point attack Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Tan et al. (2014)
Load altering attack Amini et al. (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Pasqualetti et al. (2013)
Load redistribution attack Bi and Zhang (2013); Liu et al. (2015b); Yuan et al. (2012)
Packet scheduling attack Shoukry et al. (2013)
Replay attack Gu et al. (2015); Miao and Zhu (2014); Mo et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014);
Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014)
Switching attack Hammad et al. (2015a); Liu et al. (2014b)
Topology poisoning attack Deka et al. (2015a); Giani et al. (2013); Kim and Tong (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Zhang and Sankar (2015)
Zero dynamics attack Li et al. (2015c); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2012, 2015b)
tacker’s limited physical access to most grid facilities”, and
presents a vulnerability measure for topologies of power
grids subject to attacks based on incomplete information.
On the same line, Bi and Zhang (2014) derives a necessary
and sufficient condition to perform undetectable false data
injection attack with partial topological information and
develops a min-cut method to design the optimal attack,
which requires the minimum knowledge of system topol-
ogy.
Finally, the problem of constructing a blind false data
injection attacks without explicit prior knowledge of the
power grid topology is studied by Esmalifalak et al. (2011),
Kim et al. (2015), and Yu and Chin (2015). In Esmali-
falak et al. (2011) attackers try to make inferences through
phasor observations applying linear independent compo-
nent analysis (ICA) technique. However, such technique
requires that loads are statistically independent and non-
Gaussian, and the technique need full sensor observations
(Kim et al., 2015). Kim et al. (2015) instead proposes sub-
space methods, which requires no system parameter infor-
mation. In this case the attack can be launched with only
partial sensor observations. Yu and Chin (2015) proposes
to use principal component analysis (PCA) approximation
method without the assumption regarding the distribution
of state variables, to perform the same task of making in-
ferences from the correlations of the line measurements, in
order to construct the blind false data injection attack.
Differently from the works on undetectable false data
injection attacks on power grids summarized up to here,
Qin et al. (2013) presents an unidentifiable version of this
attack, in which the control center can detect that there
are bad or malicious measurements, but it cannot identify
which meters have been compromised.
A special type of false data injection attack on electric
power grid is the load redistribution attack, in which
only load bus power injection and line power flow mea-
surements are attackable (Yuan et al., 2012). It consists
in increasing load at some buses and reducing loads at
other buses, while maintaining the total load unchanged,
in order to hide the attack from bad data detection. The
construction of load redistribution attack relies on topolog-
ical information of the network, that can be derived from
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the Jacobin matrix H. Considering the practical issue that
an attacker can only obtain the parameter information of a
limited number of lines, Liu et al. (2015b) presents a strat-
egy to determine optimal local attacking region, that re-
quires the minimum network parameter information. The
undetectability is obtained by “making sure that the vari-
ations of phase angles of all boundary buses connected to
the same island of the nonattacking region are the same”
(Liu et al., 2015b). A practical cost-aware “neighbour-
hood” version of such attack compromising only limited
measurements around the targeted bus can be found in Bi
and Zhang (2013).
The data framing attack is a deception attack on
power system state estimation that exploits current bad
data detection and removal mechanisms. It purposely trig-
gers the bad data detection mechanism and frames some
normally operating meters as sources of bad data such that
their data will be removed. After such data removal, al-
though the remaining data appear to be consistent with
the system model, the resulting state estimate may have an
arbitrarily large error (Kim et al., 2014b). Also this attack
does not require any disclosure resources, since the attack
policy is open-loop. By applying the subspace methods
presented in 2015 by Kim et al. (2015) to learn the system
operating subspace from measurements, the data framing
can be performed without knowledge of the Jacobian ma-
trix H. A limited a priori knowledge required consists of
a basis matrix U of a subspace of all possible noiseless
measurements R of H. Deka et al. (2015b) showed that a
generalization of this “detectable” attack model produces
feasible attacks in operating regimes where no “hidden”
attacks are possible, and also considered the impact of
adding measurement jamming to the adversary’s arsenal
on the design of the optimal data attacks.
The leverage point attack is a deception attack which
creates leverage points within the factor space of the (power
system) state estimation regression model (Tan et al., 2014).
The residual of the measurement corresponded with the
leverage point is very small even when it is contaminated
with a very large error. Thus the adversary can freely
introduce arbitrary errors into the meter measurements
without being detected. This attack is based on an open-
loop policy and thus does not require disclosure resources.
However, to be fully effective, it requires a complete knowl-
edge of the Jacobian matrix H and amount of disruption
resources above the threshold of undetectability
(Chakhchoukh and Ishii, 2015).
The load altering attack against power grid’s de-
mand response and demand side management programs
can bring down the grid or cause significant damage to
the power transmission and user equipment. It consists in
an attempt to control and change (usually increase) cer-
tain load types in order to damage the grid through cir-
cuit overflow or disturbing the balance between power sup-
ply and demand (Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia, 2011).
The static load altering is mainly concerned in changing
the volume of the load. Here the attacker without any
prior knowledge of the plant model uses some historical
data to impose a pre-programmed trajectory to the vic-
tim load (an open-loop policy). In the more advanced
dynamic load altering attack, presented in 2015 by Amini
et al. (2015), the adversary “constantly monitors the grid
conditions through the attacker’s installed sensors so that
it can adjust the attack trajectory based on the current con-
ditions in the power grid” (Amini et al., 2015). With this
closed-loop policy, the attacker having a complete knowl-
edge of the plant’s model controls the victim load based
on a feedback from the power system frequency and can
make the power system unstable, without the need for in-
creasing the scope or volume of the attack, compared to a
static scenario.
The attacks at physical layer range from attacks that
affect both the physical infrastructure and the control net-
work (of power grids) (Soltan et al., 2015) to attacks through
physical layer interactions, such as an attack on vehicle
platoon traveling at a constant speed, presented by Saj-
jad et al. (2015). The attack studied by Soltan et al.
(2015) physically disconnects some power lines within the
attacked zone (which is defined as a set of buses, power
lines, phasor measurement units (PMUs) and an associ-
ated phasor data concentrator (PDC) (Huang et al., 2012))
and disallows the information from the PMUs within the
zone to reach the control center. This attack does not
require any knowledge of the plant model, nor disclosure
resources. The attack on vehicle platoons (Sajjad et al.,
2015) is carried out by a maliciously controlled vehicle,
who attempts to destabilize or take control of the platoon
by combining changes to the gains of the associated law
with the appropriate vehicle movements. This closed-loop
attack “bears some resemblance to an insider version of
the replay attack of Pasqualetti et al. (2013), in that the
attacker is part of the CPS and is therefore able inject con-
trol inputs legitimately”.
In topology poisoning attack an adversary covertly
alters data from certain meters, network switches and line
breakers to mislead the control center with an incorrect
network topology. Kim and Tong (2013) shows that un-
der certain conditions even in a local information regime,
where the attacker has only local information from those
meters it has gained control, undetectable topology poi-
soning attacks exist and can be implemented easily based
on simple heuristics. Deka et al. (2015a) proves that grids
completely protected by secure measurements are also vul-
nerable to hidden topology poisoning attacks, if the adver-
sary armed only with generic information regarding the
grid structure can corrupt the breaker statuses on trans-
mission lines and jam the communication of flow measure-
ments on the attacked lines. Then, Zhang and Sankar
(2015) develops an algorithm based on breadth-first search
to determine the minimum subset of topology data and
measurements required to launch successful unobservable
state-preserving line-maintaining topology attacks.
The zero dynamics attack, first considered in Sun-
daram and Hadjicostis (2011), Pasqualetti et al. (2012a),
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is one in which an adversary constructs an open-loop policy
such that the attack signal produces no output. In other
words, “these attacks are decoupled from the plant output
yk, thus being stealthy with respect to arbitrary anomaly
detectors” (Teixeira et al., 2015b). For an attacker with
limited disruption resources, zero dynamics attacks are
based on the perfect (local) knowledge of the plant dynam-
ics. In this setting, Teixeira et al. (2012) shows that zero-
dynamics attacks may not be completely stealthy since
they require the system to be at a non-zero initial condi-
tion; however for the subset of attacks exciting unstable
zero-dynamics, the effect of initial condition mismatch in
terms of the resulting increase in the output energy can
be made arbitrarily small while still affecting the system
performance. We should notice that an adversary capa-
ble of changing all the measurements can, of course, force
the system’s output to zero without any knowledge of the
model, initial state and nominal input. Furthermore, for a
linear not left-invertible system, the knowledge of the ini-
tial state is not required, because an attacker can exploit
the kernel of the transfer matrix and the linearity of the
system.
With the covert attack, also known as a covert mis-
appropriation of the plant (Smith, 2015), an adversary
can gain control of the plant in a manner that cannot
be detected by the controller. This attack requires high
levels of system knowledge and the ability of attacker to
both read and replace communicated signals within the
control loop, indeed “the covert agent is assumed to have
the resources to read and add to both the control actuation
commands and the output measurements. In practice, this
could also be accomplished by augmenting the physical ac-
tuators or modifying the sensors. Examples of such modi-
fications include installing a controlled-flow bypass around
a sluice gate in an irrigation system and connecting a con-
trolled voltage source between a voltage measuring device
and its intended connection point in an electrical network.
Another potential mode of attack would involve corrupting
the PLCs used by the nominal controller to implement the
control and sensing operations” (Smith, 2015). Pasqualetti
et al. (2013) observe that the covert attack can be seen as
a feedback version of the replay attack, while Smith (2015)
examines also the effects of lower levels of system knowl-
edge and nonlinear plants on the ability to detect a covert
misappropriation of the plant.
The replay attack is a deception attack (possibly com-
bined with a physical attack), in which an adversary first
gathers sequences of measurement and/or control data,
and then replays the recorded data while injecting an ex-
ogenous signal into the system (Teixeira et al., 2015b).
The adversary requires no knowledge of the system model
to generate stealthy outputs. However, the attacker needs
to have “enough knowledge of the system model to design
an input that may achieve its malicious objective, such as
physically damaging the plant” (Mo et al., 2015). The
model of this attack is inspired by the Stuxnet (Chen and
Abu-Nimeh, 2011).
A generic deception attack is an attack on data in-
tegrity, where an adversary sends false information from
(one or more) sensors or/and controllers in order to de-
ceive a compromised system’s component into believing
that a received false data is valid or true (Mo and Sinop-
oli, 2012). Usually it is modeled as an arbitrary additive
signal injected to override the original data. Since generic
deception attacks can be used to represent also other, more
specialized deception attacks, they are considered mostly
in the studies adopting the defender’s point of view, pre-
sented in Section 5.2.
There are 26 (18.8% of all) studies using a generic de-
ception attack model only to develop some defense strat-
egy, whilst the false-data injection into the communica-
tion network supporting the control system examined by
Sanjab and Saad (2015) was already mentioned in Sec-
tion 5.10. The remaining 14 primary studies present (generic)
deception attacks, that are different from any other attack
considered above. Vrakopoulou et al. (2015) deals with a
cyber-attack on the automatic generation control (AGC)
signal in multi-area power system as a controller synthe-
sis problem, where the objective is to drive the system
outside the safety margins. It investigates two cases ac-
cording to whether the attacker has perfect model knowl-
edge or not, and provides different alternatives for at-
tack synthesis, ranging from “open loop approaches, based
on Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) optimization, to
close loop schemes based on feedback linearization and gain
scheduling” (Vrakopoulou et al., 2015). Always within
power grids’ application domain, Vuković and Dán (2014)
consider a sophisticated adversary, that knows the sys-
tem model and aims to disable the state-of-the-art dis-
tributed state estimation by preventing it from converg-
ing. To this end, he or she compromises the communi-
cation infrastructure of a single control center in an in-
terconnected power system, in order to manipulate the
exchanged data (i.e. state variables) used as an input to
the state estimator. The stealthy cyber attacks that max-
imize the error in unmanned aerial systems’ state estima-
tion are studied in Kwon et al. (2014). To consider the
worst-case security problem, this study assumes the at-
tacker has the perfect knowledge on the system model and
can compromise sensors and/or actuators. The attacks on
both sensors and actuators by the adversary with a per-
fect knowledge of the static parameters of a CPS (mod-
eled as a discrete LTI system equipped with a Kalman
filter, LQR and χ2 failure detector) are considered also by
Mo and Sinopoli (2012), where the adversary’s strategy
is formulated as a constrained control problem. Djouadi
et al. (2014) instead present optimal sensor signal attacks
for the observer-based finite and infinite horizon linear
quadratic (LQ) control in terms of maximizing the cor-
responding cost functions. Also this study assumes full-
information, i.e. the system parameters are known to the
adversary. Zhang et al. (2014) studies stealthy deception
attacks on remote state estimation with communication
rate constraints. Here the deception attacker intrudes the
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sensor, learns its online transmission strategy, and then
modifies the event-based sensor transmission schedule in
order to degrade the estimation quality. Li et al. (2015a)
observes that sensors adopt an acknowledgement (ACK)-
based online power schedule to improve the remote state
estimation performance under limited resources, and that
an attacker can modify the ACKs from the remote esti-
mator and convey fake information to the sensor, thereby
misleading the sensor with subsequent performance degra-
dation. Li et al. (2015a) is a part of the research line repre-
sented by Li et al. (2015b). Lastly, Qi et al. (2015) designs
an event-based (online) attack strategy to degrade the real-
time state estimation quality with arbitrary communica-
tion rate constraint; this deception attack can be imple-
mented by compromising a sensor in order to learn and
modify the transmission decisions, eavesdropping the mea-
surements and injecting false feedback information into the
sensor. For the domain of electricity market, Tan et al.
(2015) studies the impact of two common and broad classes
of simple integrity attacks on real-time pricing, where ei-
ther the prices advertised to consumers are compromised
by a scaling factor or timing information of prices is cor-
rupted, and provides the conditions under which the sys-
tem is at risk of being destabilized. Jia et al. (2014) stud-
ies the average relative perturbation of the real-time lo-
cational marginal price as an optimization problem; the
adversary is assumed to have not only the perfect knowl-
edge of the system model, but also the possibility to ac-
cess the measurement values in real-time, in order to inject
bad data that is state independent, partially adaptive, or
even fully adaptive. Targeting power consumption sector,
Mishra et al. (2015a) introduces the price modification at-
tack (under the name of rate alteration attack) which in-
duces changes in load profiles of individual users through
fabrication of price messages and eventually causes major
alteration in the load profile of the entire power network.
A stealthy deception scheme capable of compromising the
performance of the automated cascade canal irrigation sys-
tems is presented by Amin et al. (2010). This attack
scheme is based on approximate knowledge of canal hydro-
dynamics and is implemented via switching the linearized
shallow water partial differential equation parameters and
proportional boundary control actions, to withdraw water
from the pools through offtakes. Similarly, the stealthy
deception attacks on process control systems performed
by a very powerful adversary with knowledge of the ex-
act linear model of the plant, the parameters of anomaly
detector and control command signals, are presented by
Cárdenas et al. (2011). In the most sophisticated attack
considered in this study, adversaries “try to shift the be-
havior of the system very discretely at the beginning of the
attack and then maximize the damage after the system has
been moved to a more vulnerable state” (Cárdenas et al.,
2011). Finally, for a single-input single-output plant, Bai
et al. (2015) analytically characterizes an optimal stealthy
attack strategy, that maximizes the estimation error of








Fig. 20: Distribution of studies by attack scheme
a function of the system parameters, noise statistics and
information available to the attacker.
From such literature a systematic characterization of
“types” of attack is emerging, even if the “generic decep-
tion attack” and “false data injection attack” have been
primarily addressed.
5.13. Attack scheme
In this section we distinguish the selected studies based
on whether they consider centralized, distributed or local
attack strategies. The mapping between the considered
attack schemes and the primary studies is reported in Ta-
ble 15, whilst the distribution of studies based on this facet
is summarized in Fig. 20.
The overwhelming majority of primary studies (117,
i.e. 84.8% of all selected works) considers only near om-
niscient adversary, capable of compromising several sys-
tem components in a centralized fashion, whereas there
are only 7 works that study distributed attacks, and 18
(i.e. 13.0%) studies dealing with local attacks. It is clear
from this data that local and especially distributed solu-
tions require more attention.
As a side note, we observe that some works are consid-
ering the vulnerability of the system on both global and
local scales, with attacks following a specific coordination
model. As an example, in Kim and Tong (2013) both cen-
tralized and distributed attacks relying only on local mea-
surements observed in the clusters are constructed, while
in Davis et al. (2012) the adversary needs only local in-
formation to achieve the attack, but the work builds on
a previous article from the same authors where a typical
centralized attack was considered.
5.14. Plant model used by the attacker
This facet characterizes a modeling framework8 used
by an adversary to design an attack on a CPS. Since at-
tacker’s knowledge of the control system and plant model
can be limited or absent, an adversary may rely on a model
of plant that is different from the actual model used by a
system operator. Here our focus is on such cases. Fig. 21
shows the distribution of the primary studies by plant
model used by an attacker.
In 114 studies (82.6%) it is assumed that the attacker
uses the same model of the plant as the system operator,
while in 21 studies (15.2%) the adversary does not use
any model of plant. In the remaining 3 works, listed in
8See Section 5.5 for the analysis of the considered plant models.
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Table 15: Attack schemes.
Attack scheme Primary studies
Centralized Amin et al. (2009, 2010); Amini et al. (2015); Anwar et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Befekadu et al.
(2015); Bezzo et al. (2015, 2014); Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas
et al. (2011); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al.
(2012); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Do et al.
(2015); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013);
Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al. (2015); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014);
Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al.
(2014b,a, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon et al.
(2014); Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Li et al. (2015c); Liu et al. (2014a,c, 2015a, 2011); Lo and
Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2014,
2015a,b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Naghnaeian et al. (2015);
Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pajic et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2011, 2013); Qin et al.
(2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015);
Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015a,b); Shoukry and
Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tajer et al. (2011); Talebi
et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2015, 2014); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2010, 2015a, 2012, 2015b); Tiwari et al. (2014);
Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015);
Weimer et al. (2014); Xie et al. (2011); Xu and Zhu (2015); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Yu and Chin
(2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015); Zhu
et al. (2013); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Distributed Hammad et al. (2015a); Liu et al. (2014b); Ozay et al. (2013); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Tajer et al. (2011); Wei and Kundur
(2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Local Davis et al. (2012); Hammad et al. (2015a); Kim and Tong (2013); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Li et al. (2015b); Liang et al.
(2014); Liu et al. (2014b, 2015b); Ozay et al. (2013); Qi et al. (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Sundaram et al. (2010); Vrakopoulou








Fig. 21: Distribution of primary studies by plant model used by an
attacker
Table 16, the attacker uses a model of plant that is sim-
pler than the one used by operator. In particular, in the
works of Kim et al. (2014b, 2015) data framing attacks on
power transmission system are designed using a linearized
system. It is shown that such attacks can successfully per-
turb a nonlinear “state estimate, and the attacker is able to
control the degree of perturbation as desired” (Kim et al.,
2014b). This is an answer on the question on “whether
attacks constructed from a linear model is effective in a
nonlinear system” (Kim et al., 2015). Liang et al. (2014)
studies both DC and AC attack models to construct the
false data injection in AC state estimation, showing that
the DC attack is detectable when the injected values are
too large, while the AC attack model permits to “hide the
attack completely” (Liang et al., 2014).
5.15. Defense scheme
Similarly to attack schemes, we differentiate the stud-
ies also based on whether the proposed approach to de-
fend a CPS focuses on the local or global scale of the
system. In case of the global scale, this dimension also
specifies whether a defense mechanism uses centralized or
distributed coordination model.
We recall from Section 5.2 that there are 35 primary
studies adopting only an adversary’s point of view and not
concerned with countermeasures against attacks. We say
that for them the defense schemes are not available. The
distribution of remaining (103, i.e. 74.6%) primary studies
by defense scheme is shown in Fig. 22, while the related
mapping is reported in Table 17.
Most of the studies (82) on defense mechanisms uses
only centralized scheme, while the local scale is considered
only in 9 works (Pasqualetti et al. (2012b) and Liu et al.
(2012), related to Pasqualetti et al. (2013) and Liu et al.
(2014b), respectively, Liu et al. (2014c), Kogiso and Fujita
(2015), Li et al. (2015b), Naghnaeian et al. (2015), Yuan
and Mo (2015), together with Sou et al. (2014), where the
centralized scheme with some relevant local dependencies
is taken into account, and Sajjad et al. (2015), where a slid-
ing mode control using only local sensor information and
a decentralized attack detector is considered). Distributed
approaches are examined in 14 works (alone in Pasqualetti
et al. (2011), Tajer et al. (2011), Zhu et al. (2013), Mishra
et al. (2014), Park et al. (2014), Vuković and Dán (2014),
Xue et al. (2014), Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015), Wei and
Kundur (2015) and alongside centralized ones in Ozay
et al. (2013), Pasqualetti et al. (2013), Hammad et al.
(2015b), Li et al. (2015a)). We must point out that accord-
ing to our selection strategy we do not consider the studies
focused on the typical distributed problem of reaching con-
sensus in the presence of malicious agents (Sundaram and
Hadjicostis, 2011; Pasqualetti et al., 2012a); this is because
in these works the dynamics is part of the consensus algo-
rithm and can be specifically designed, rather than being
given as in a physical system (Gu et al., 2015).
This data suggests that distributed and local defense
solutions require more attention and surely present a promis-
ing direction in research on security of CPS from automatic
control point of view.
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Table 16: Plant model used by an attacker.
Plant model Primary studies
Absent Amin et al. (2009); Befekadu et al. (2015); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Do et al. (2015); Foroush and
Mart́ınez (2013); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Liu et al. (2014c); Mo et al. (2015);
Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015a); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Soltan et al. (2015);
Tan et al. (2015); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014)
Different Kim et al. (2014b, 2015); Liang et al. (2014)
Table 17: Defense schemes.
Defense scheme Primary studies
Centralized Amin et al. (2009, 2010); Anwar et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al.
(2015, 2014); Bi and Zhang (2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Cetinkaya
et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Davis et al. (2012); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Deka et al. (2014); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015);
Do et al. (2015); Esmalifalak et al. (2013); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013);
Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al. (2015); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014);
Huang et al. (2011); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011);
Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Li et al. (2015c); Liu et al. (2014a,
2015a); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao et al. (2014); Mishra
et al. (2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2015); Mo et al. (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay
et al. (2013); Pajic et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-
Rad (2012); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Shoukry
et al. (2013, 2015a,b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Talebi
et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2014); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2012); Tiwari et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013);
Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xu
and Zhu (2015); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Distributed Hammad et al. (2015b); Li et al. (2015a); Mishra et al. (2014); Ozay et al. (2013); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2011,
2013); Sajjad et al. (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Tajer et al. (2011); Vuković and Dán (2014); Wei and Kundur
(2015); Xue et al. (2014); Zhu et al. (2013)
Local only Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Li et al. (2015b); Liu et al. (2014b,c); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Sajjad
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Fig. 23: Distribution of primary studies by prevention approach
5.16. Defense strategy
We have already anticipated in Section 5.2 that coun-
termeasures against attacks, i.e. actions minimizing the
risk of threats, are presented in more than three-fourth
of primary studies, and occupy the central spot of the
research efforts. The defense strategies can be classified
as prevention, detection, and mitigation (Teixeira et al.,
2015); following the line of the fault diagnosis literature
(Hwang et al., 2010), we advocate isolation as a further
defense strategy extending detection approaches.
Prevention aims at decreasing the likelihood of at-
tacks by reducing the vulnerability of the system (Teix-
eira et al., 2015). It brings together all the actions per-
formed offline, before the system is perturbed or attacked.
There are 45 studies (32.6%) studying exclusively preven-
tion mechanisms. These studies range from security met-
rics for the vulnerability analysis of systems or their crit-
ical components to design and analysis of resilient state
estimators and controllers capable to withstand some at-
tacks, and protection-based approaches aiming to identify
and secure some strategic distributed components. Fig. 23
shows the distribution of the primary studies focussing on
prevention, whilst Table 18 provides the related mapping
and Table 19 reports the mapping of individual studies to
each defense strategy.
Twenty one studies present protection-based approach-
es. Among them, there are 7 studies discussing the secure
sensor allocation against undetectable false data injection
attacks in power transmission networks. More specifically,
Bobba et al. (2010) show that it is necessary and sufficient
to protect a set of basic measurements (in number equal
to number of all the unknown state variables in the state
estimation problem) to ensure that no such attack can
be launched, while Giani et al. (2013) proof that placing
p+1 secure phasor measurement units (PMUs) at carefully
chosen buses are sufficient to neutralize any collection of
p sparse attacks, and Kim and Tong (2013) present a so-
called cover-up protection that identifies the set of meters
that need to be secured so an undetectable attack does
not exist for any target topology. Also Yang et al. (2014)
identifies the critical meters to protect and observes that
the meters measuring bus injection powers play a more
important role than the ones measuring the transmission
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Table 18: Prevention-based approaches to defense.
Prevention approach Primary studies
Control Amin et al. (2009); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad
et al. (2015b); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhu
and Mart́ınez (2014)
Protection-based Anwar et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang (2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Deka et al. (2014);
Esmalifalak et al. (2013); Giani et al. (2013); Hao et al. (2015); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim and Poor (2011); Lo and
Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Miao et al. (2014); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Rahman et al. (2014);
Soltan et al. (2015); Talebi et al. (2012); Teixeira et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Yang et al.
(2014)
Security metrics Bai et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Jia et al. (2014); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon and Hwang
(2013b); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Vuković et al. (2012); Xue et al. (2014)
State estimation Giani et al. (2013); Liu et al. (2015a); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2015); Pajic et al. (2015); Shoukry
et al. (2013); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Tan et al. (2014); Weimer et al. (2014)
Table 19: Defense strategies.
Defense strategy Primary studies
Detection Amin et al. (2010); Bezzo et al. (2014); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Davis et al. (2012); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Do et al.
(2015); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Gu et al. (2015); Hao et al. (2015); Huang et al. (2011); Jones et al. (2014); Kosut
et al. (2011); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Li et al. (2015c); Liu et al. (2014a); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and
Zhu (2014); Mo et al. (2015); Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2011, 2013);
Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sedghi and Jonckheere
(2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a,b); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tajer et al. (2011); Tang
et al. (2015); Tiwari et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vuković and Dán (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Wei
and Kundur (2015); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Isolation Amin et al. (2010); Bezzo et al. (2014); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Davis et al. (2012); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Do et al.
(2015); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Hao et al. (2015); Jones et al. (2014); Kosut et al. (2011); Liu et al. (2014a); Nudell
et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Qin et al. (2013); Sedghi and Jonckheere
(2015); Shoukry et al. (2015b); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tajer et al. (2011); Tiwari
et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vuković and Dán (2014); Wei and Kundur (2015); Yang et al. (2016); Zonouz et al.
(2012)
Mitigation Barreto et al. (2013); Bezzo et al. (2014); Cárdenas et al. (2011); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush
and Mart́ınez (2013); Kwon and Hwang (2013a); Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015b); Liu et al. (2014b,c); Qin et al. (2013);
Rhouma et al. (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a,b); Soltan et al. (2015); Sundaram
et al. (2010); Tajer et al. (2011); Vuković and Dán (2014); Wei and Kundur (2015); Xu and Zhu (2015); Zhu and Başar
(2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Prevention Amin et al. (2009); Anwar et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang (2014);
Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Deka et al. (2014);
Esmalifalak et al. (2013); Giani et al. (2013); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx
et al. (2014); Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim and Poor (2011); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Kosut et al. (2011);
Kwon and Hwang (2013b); Liu et al. (2015a); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Miao et al. (2014); Mishra et al.
(2014, 2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Pajic et al.
(2015); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Shoukry et al. (2013); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014);
Soltan et al. (2015); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2014); Teixeira et al. (2012); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014);
Wang and Ren (2014); Weimer et al. (2014); Xue et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2014); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez
(2014)
line power flows, since they are essential in determining
a specific state variable, while the measurements of line
power flows are redundant to improve the accuracy of
state estimation. As finding the minimum number of pro-
tected sensors such that an adversary cannot inject false
data without being detected is NP-hard9 (Bobba et al.,
2010), Kim and Poor (2011), Deka et al. (2014) and Hao
et al. (2015) present greedy algorithms to select a subset
of measurements to be protected. Besides secure sensor
allocation, there are obviously several other protection-
based approaches considered in the primary studies. For
instance, to validate the correctness of customers’ energy
usage by detecting anomaly activities at the consumption
level in the power distribution network, Lo and Ansari
(2013) present “a hybrid anomaly intrusion detection sys-
tem framework, which incorporates power information and
9since this problem is reducible to the hitting set problem
sensor placement along with grid-placed sensor algorithms
using graph theory to provide network observability.” To
reveal zero-dynamics attacks, Teixeira et al. (2012) pro-
vide necessary and sufficient conditions on modifications
of the CPS’s structure and presents an algorithm to de-
ploy additional measurements to this end, while Bopar-
dikar and Speranzon (2013) develop design strategies that
can prevent or make stealth attacks difficult to be carried
out; the proposed modifications of the legacy control sys-
tem include optimal allocation of countermeasures and de-
sign of augmented system using a Moore-Penrose pseudo-
inverse. Then, Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011)
discuss the defense mechanisms against static load altering
attacks and presents a cost-efficient load protection design
problem minimizing the cost of protection while ensuring
that the remaining unprotected load cannot cause circuit
overflow or any other major harm to the electric grid. For
electricity market domain, Esmalifalak et al. (2013) use
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a two-person zero-sum game model to obtain an equilib-
rium solution in protecting different measurements against
false data injection attacks impacting locational marginal
price (LMP). Within the same domain, Ma et al. (2015)
consider a multiact dynamic game where the attacker can
jam a reduced number of signal channels carrying measure-
ment information in order to manipulate the LMP creating
an opportunity for gaining profit, and the defender is able
to guarantee a limited number of channels in information
delivery. Other protection-based approaches include, for
instance “intentionally switch on/off one of the selected
transmission lines by turns, and therefore change the sys-
tem topology” (Wang and Ren, 2014); dynamically change
the set of measurements considered in state estimation and
the admittances of a set of lines in the topology in a con-
trolled fashion (Rahman et al., 2014), that is an appli-
cation of a moving target defense (MTD) paradigm; use
covert topological information by keeping the exact reac-
tance of a set of transmission lines secret, possibly jointly
with securing some meter measurements (Bi and Zhang,
2014); use an algebric criterion to reconfigure and parti-
tion a Jacobian matrix H into two sub-matrices, on each
of which to perform a corresponding residual test (Talebi
et al., 2012); use graph partition algorithms to decompose
a power system into several subsystems, where false data
do not have enough space to hide behind normal mea-
surement errors (Wang et al., 2014); or even use voltage
stability index (Chakravorty and Das, 2001) to identify
nodes in power distribution networks with similar levels
of vulnerabilities to false data injection attacks via a hy-
brid clustering algorithm (Anwar et al., 2015); “employ
a coding matrix to the original sensor outputs to increase
the estimation residues, such that the alarm will be trig-
gered by the detector even under intelligent data injection
attacks” (Miao et al., 2014), under the assumption that
the attacker does not know the coding matrix yet. Fi-
nally, in order to detect and isolate the disconnected lines
and recover the phase angles, in front of the joint cyber
and physical attack (Soltan et al., 2015) outlined in Sec-
tion 5.12, Soltan et al. (2015) present an algorithm that
partitions the power grid into the minimum number of
attack-resilient zones, ensuring the proposed online meth-
ods are guaranteed to succeed.
Moreover, nine over eleven resilient controllers and
eight over ten state estimators presented in the primary
studies and reported in Table 18 were already described
in the end of Sections 5.10 and 5.8, respectively. The only
works not discussed there are Bezzo et al. (2015), Mishra
et al. (2014), and Shoukry et al. (2013). In Bezzo et al.
(2015), an algorithm that leverages the theory of Markov
decision processes was built to determine the optimal pol-
icy to plan the motion of unmanned vehicles and avoid
unsafe regions of a state space despite the attacks on sen-
sor measurements, when “the system is fully observable
and at least one measurement (however unknown) returns
a correct estimate of a state”. In Mishra et al. (2014),
the state estimation was performed in a private and se-
cure manner across multiple computing nodes (observers)
with an approach inspired by techniques in cryptography,
i.e. decoding Reed-Solomon codes, and results from es-
timation theory, such as Cramer-Rao lower bound, as a
guarantee on the secrecy of the plant’s state against cor-
rupting observers. Finally, Shoukry et al. (2013) presented
a minimax state estimator and controller design as a
defense against packet scheduling attacks.
Always under the umbrella of prevention-based defense,
there are 9 works presenting security metrics, such as
security indices defined in the context of power networks
as a minimum number of meters to perform an unobserv-
able attack whether including (Hendrickx et al., 2014) or
not (Kosut et al., 2011) a given meter, and ε-stealthiness,
which is a notion that quantifies the difficulty to detect
an attack when an arbitrary detection algorithm is imple-
mented by the controller (Bai et al., 2015). A vulnerability
measure for topologies of power grids subject to false data
injection attacks based on incomplete information is pre-
sented by Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012), while the
vulnerability of the power system state estimator to at-
tacks performed against the communication infrastructure
is analyzed by Vuković et al. (2012) via security metrics
that quantify the importance of individual substations and
the cost of attacking individual measurements in terms
of number of substations that have to be attacked. For
the domain of electricity market, Jia et al. (2014) intro-
duces the average relative price perturbation as a measure
of a system-wide price perturbation resulting from a de-
ception attack described in Section 5.12. In the context
of canonical double-integrator-network (DIN) model of au-
tonomous vehicle networks, to reflect the quality of the ad-
versary’s estimate of the desired nonrandom statistics Xue
et al. (2014) defines “the error covariance for a minimum-
variance-unbiased estimate of the initial-condition vector
as the security level matrix” and considers its scalar mea-
sures as security levels characterizing the confidentiality
of network’s state. Kwon and Hwang (2013b) consider
the dynamic behavior cost and estimation error costs to
analytically test the behavior of unmanned aerial systems
under various deception attacks and quantify their severity
accordingly. Finally, for generic CPS described as linear
time-invariant dynamical systems, Chen et al. (2015) gives
a necessary and sufficient condition for the attacker to be
undetectable in terms of the system dynamics eigenvec-
tors, and provides an index that determines the minimum
number of sensors that must be attacked in order for an
attack to be undetectable and use this index to demon-
strate a design guideline for improving the resilience of
the system to sensor attacks.
The distribution of primary studies between offline and
online defense strategies is shown in Fig. 24, while the dis-
tribution of studies by online defense strategy is reported
in Fig. 25.
The online approaches come into play after adversar-
ial events happen (Zhu and Başar, 2015). Detection is an









Fig. 24: Distribution between defense strategies
Fig. 25: Distribution by online defense strategy
itored for anomalies caused by adversary actions (Teixeira
et al., 2015), in order to decide whether an attack has
occurred. Attack isolation is one step beyond attack de-
tection, since it distinguishes between different types of
attacks (Hwang et al., 2010), and requires also that the
exact location(s) of the compromised components(s) be
identified (Sou et al., 2014). Once an anomaly or attack is
detected (and isolated), mitigation actions may be taken
to disrupt and neutralize the attack, thus reducing its im-
pact (Teixeira et al., 2015).
Among the 55 studies concerned with online defenses,
16 are focused on detection only, other 18 on detection
and isolation, 3 on detection and mitigation, and 8 on
detection, isolation and mitigation. There are 12 works
studying mitigation only, and two works on isolation and
mitigation, as reported in Table 19.
To contrast unidentifiable false data injection, Qin et al.
(2013) present an algorithm to enumerate all feasible cases
and proposes a mitigation strategy to minimize the average
damage to the system. Another work on isolation and
mitigation is Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013), which intro-
duces joint identification and control strategy, that ren-
ders the system asymptotically stable in front of unknown
periodic DoS in form of pulse-width modulated jamming
attacks.
Four of the works focused on mitigation were already
described in previous Sections (i.e. Fawzi et al. (2014) in
5.8, Zhu et al. (2013), Kwon and Hwang (2013a), Xu and
Zhu (2015) in 5.10). Here we spend some words on the
remaining 8 studies. Lee et al. (2015) presents a secure
and robust state estimation scheme that correctly esti-
mates the states under sensor attacks by exploiting sens-
ing redundancy. It guarantees a bounded estimation er-
ror despite measurement noises and process disturbances.
Sanjab and Saad (2015) instead introduces a novel game-
theoretic approach to analyze false data injections attacks
that involve a smart grid defender and multiple adver-
saries, showing that at the equilibrium, multiple attacks
can eliminate the effect of one another thus requiring no
defense; however, under different conditions, a defense mech-
anism can be beneficial in reducing the combined effect of
the different attacks on the system. Liu et al. (2014b)
recalls their own study of strategies to be “employed by
a power system operator in the face of a switching attack
to steer the system to a stable equilibrium through persis-
tent co-switching and by leveraging the existence of a sta-
ble sliding mode” (Liu et al., 2012). Zhu and Başar (2015)
presents a cross-layer, hybrid dynamic game-theoretic mod-
el that captures the coupling between the cyber and the
physical layers of the system dynamics, extending the con-
trol and defense strategy designs “to incorporate post-event
system states, where resilient control and cyber strategies
are developed to deal with uncertainties and events that are
not taken into account in pre-event robustness and security
designs” (Zhu and Başar, 2015). The overall optimal de-
sign of the cyber-physical system is characterized here by a
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs equation, together with a Shapley
optimality criterion. Also Barreto et al. (2013) studies a
game-theory problem (via differential games and heuristic
stability games) where the actions of the players are the
control signals each of them has access to. It focuses on
reactive security mechanisms, which change the control ac-
tions in response to attacks. Another game-theoretic study
is Liu et al. (2014c), in which the objective of the defender
is to guarantee the dynamic performance of the NCS by
transmitting signals with higher power levels than that
of jammer’s noisy signals. The cost function of the pro-
posed two-player zero-sum stochastic game includes “not
only the resource costs used to conduct cyber-layer defense
or attack actions, but also the dynamic performance (in-
dexed by quadratic state errors) of the NCS” (Liu et al.,
2014c). Also Li et al. (2015b) presents a two-player zero-
sum game, to investigate the interactive decision-making
process between a sensor node of a remote state estimator
and an attacker who can launch DoS attacks. It uses a
novel payoff function and strategies set, which take into
account the energy constraints on both sides. To con-
trast the DoS attacks characterized by their frequency and
duration, De Persis and Tesi (2015) determines suitable
scheduling of the transmission times achieving input-to-
state stability (ISS) of the closed-loop system. It considers
periodic, event-based and self-triggering implementation
of sampling logics, all of which adapt the sampling rate to
the occurrence of DoS and, sometimes, to the closed-loop
behavior.
The research line of Rhouma, Keller, Sauter, Chabir
and Abdelkrim (2015) comprises both mitigation and de-
tection in separate papers. Specifically, in Rhouma et al.
(2015) the generalized likelihood ratio test is designed to
detect the termination of a zero dynamics attack and quick-
ly recover the nominal behaviour of the linear quadratic
Gaussian controller, while in Keller and Sauter (2013) a
modified Kalman filter able to detect the zero-dynamic
attack in absence of sensor or actuator faults is presented.
Regarding other detection mechanisms, most of all









Fig. 26: Distribution of studies by research type
we introduce only the remaining ones. Pasqualetti et al.
(2013) characterizes fundamental monitoring limitations
of descriptor systems from system-theoretic and graph-
theoretic perspectives, and designs centralized and dis-
tributed monitors, which are complete, in the sense that
they detect and identify every (detectable and identifi-
able) attack. To protect active sensing systems against
physical attacks occurring in the analog domain, Shoukry
et al. (2015a) introduced a physical challenge-response au-
thentication scheme, that continually challenge the sur-
rounding environment via random but deliberate phys-
ical probes. For a system equipped with multiple con-
trollers/estimators/detectors, such that each combination
of these components constitute a subsystem, Miao and
Zhu (2014) presents a moving-horizon approach to solve
a zero-sum hybrid stochastic game and obtain a saddle-
point equilibrium policy for balancing the system’s secu-
rity overhead and control cost, since each subsystem has
a probability to detect specific types of attacks with dif-
ferent control and detection costs. In the power systems
domain, Hao et al. (2015) takes advantage of the sparse
and low rank properties of the block measurements for a
time interval to make use of robust PCA with element-
wise constraints to improve both the error tolerance and
the capability of detecting false data with partial observa-
tions.
The detection and identification of false data injec-
tion attacks on power transmission systems is considered
by Davis et al. (2012), which outlines an “observe and per-
turb methodology” to compare the expected results of a
control action with the observed response of the system,
while Ozay et al. (2013) use a modified version of nor-
malized residual test coupled with proposed state vector
estimation methods against sparse attacks. Assuming the
attack signal enters through the electro-mechanical swing
dynamics of the synchronous generators in the grid as an
unknown additive disturbance, Nudell et al. (2015) divide
the grid into coherent areas via “phasor-based model re-
duction algorithm by which a dynamic equivalent of the
clustered network can be identified in real-time”, and local-
izes which area the attack may have entered using relevant
information extracted from the phasor measurement data.
6. Results - Validation Strategies (RQ3)
We determined the research type and related research
methods of each primary study, simulation models, sim-
ulation test systems and experimental testbeds used, re-
peatability and availability of replication package. In the
following we describe the main facts emerging from the
collected data.
6.1. Research type and related research methods
Following the guidelines of systematic mapping stud-
ies, we reuse the classification of research approaches pro-
posed by Wieringa et al. (2006), applying the research type
classification presented in Petersen et al. (2015). Since
our selection strategy (see Section 3.4) focuses on studies
proposing a method or technique for CPS security, so the
philosophical papers, opinion papers and experience papers
are not considered in our study. The distribution of studies
by research type is presented in Fig. 26, while the relative
mapping is reported in Table 20.
Solution proposals for specific research problems, where
the potential benefits and the applicability of a solution is
simply shown through a small example or a line of argu-
mentation, are given in 53 (i.e. 38.4% of all) studies. Those
solutions are either novel or a significant extension of exist-
ing ones, and often correspond to the results of theoretical
research.
Validation research is applied in 84 studies (60.9%),
where the techniques investigated are novel and have not
yet been implemented in practice; the research methods
used are formal mathematical proofs, case studies and lab
experiments, together with simulations as a means for con-
ducting an empirical study.
Finally, evaluation research, where the techniques are
implemented in practice with identification of problems in
industry, is done only in one study (Amin et al., 2010),
in which the Gignac irrigation canal network is used to
demonstrate the feasibility of stealthy deception attacks
on water SCADA systems.
The mapping of the validation methods used by each
primary study is documented in Table 21. Notably, formal
mathematical proofs are employed in 75 studies (54.3%),
while the remaining 63 works are using just the sound
argument. Small numerical examples can be found in 79
works (57.2%), whilst simulation test systems, described
in Section 6.3, are used to validate the presented results
in 90 primary studies (65.2%).
Case studies via simulation, understood as empirical
inquiries that draw on multiple sources of evidence to in-
vestigate contemporary phenomena in their real-life con-
text, especially when the boundary between phenomenon
and context cannot be clearly specified (Wohlin et al.,
2012), are employed in 7 studies, as reported in Table 21.
It is worth noting that in Bezzo et al. (2015) also a hard-
ware evaluation on a remotely controlled flying quadri-
copter is performed, while the case study of D’Innocenzo
et al. (2015) is extracted from its previous work cited
therein (D’Innocenzo et al., 2013).
Experiments are formal, rigorous and controlled em-
pirical investigations, where one factor or variable of the
studied setting is manipulated, while all the other param-
eters are regulated at fixed levels (Wohlin et al., 2012).
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Table 20: Research type.
Research type Primary studies
Evaluation Research Amin et al. (2010)
Solution Proposal Amin et al. (2009); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bi and Zhang (2013); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and
Speranzon (2013); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al. (2012); De Persis and
Tesi (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2013); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Huang et al. (2011); Hug
and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim et al. (2014a); Kim and Poor (2011); Kogiso and Fujita
(2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013b); Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015b,c); Liu et al. (2014a); Ma
et al. (2015); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2011); Qi et al. (2015); Qin et al. (2013); Rawat and Bajracharya
(2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Tajer et al. (2011); Tang
et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2010, 2012); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014);
Xie et al. (2011); Xue et al. (2014); Yuan et al. (2012); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014);
Zhu and Başar (2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Validation Research Amini et al. (2015); Anwar et al. (2015); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015, 2014); Bi and Zhang (2014); Cárdenas
et al. (2011); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Do et al. (2015);
Esmalifalak et al. (2011); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al. (2015); Gupta
et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b,a); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al.
(2014b, 2015); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon and Hwang (2013a); Kwon et al. (2014); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014);
Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014b,c, 2015a,b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu
(2014); Miao et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Mohsenian-Rad
and Leon-Garcia (2011); Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pajic et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al.
(2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015);
Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015a,b); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al.
(2010); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2015, 2014); Teixeira et al. (2015a,b); Tiwari et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013);
Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Wei and Kundur (2015); Xu
and Zhu (2015); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Zhang et al. (2014); Zhang and
Sankar (2015); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Among all the considered studies, there are only 7 works
(5.1%) using experimental testbeds, namely Gignac irriga-
tion canal network seen in Amin et al. (2010); quadruple-
tank process (Johansson, 2000), that is a multivariable
laboratory process consisting of four interconnected wa-
ter tanks, used by Teixeira et al. (2015b); LandShark10
robot, i.e. a fully electric unmanned ground vehicle de-
veloped by Black I Robotics, adopted in 3 works (Bezzo
et al., 2014; Tiwari et al., 2014; Pajic et al., 2015)11; ad-hoc
testbed consisting of sensors attached to a Mazda Rx7 tone
ring, which in turn is attached to a DC motor simulating
a rotating wheel, used as a platform for testing security
of magnetic encoder12 against active spoofing attacks in
Shoukry et al. (2015a); micro grid experimental testbed
consisting of three Siemens SENTRON PAC4200 smart
meters connected into the network with YanHua Industry
control machine, which is used to monitor all traffic of lab
network and read the data from all meters, employed in
Mishra et al. (2015a).
This data indicates that experimental testbed used by
researchers on CPS security (with ties to Automatic Con-
trol community) are still too few, and the validation of
the proposed solutions requires major attention. We be-
lieve that there is a pressing need for implementation and
adoption of testbeds with different capabilities for exten-
sive experimental verifications of proposed solutions.
10http://www.blackirobotics.com/LandShark_UGV_UC0M.html
11The LandShark is used in Pajic et al. (2014), which belongs to
the research line of Pajic et al. (2015).
12It relies on magnetic variations to measure the angular velocity








Fig. 27: Distribution of primary studies by simulation model
6.2. Simulation model
As in the case of plant models used by attackers, also
the plant models adopted for simulation purposes can be
different from the plant models used in the analysis. As we
can see from Fig. 27, an overwhelming majority of primary
studies uses the same model of plant for both the analy-
sis and simulation, while only in 6 studies (4.3%) these
models are different (Jia et al., 2014; Kim and Tong, 2013;
Kim et al., 2014a, 2015; Wang et al., 2014; Chakhchoukh
and Ishii, 2015). Those six studies are within the power
transmission or electricity market application domains and
use nonlinear AC model for simulation, while consider a
DC model (sometimes together with AC model) for anal-
ysis purposes. It is worth to mention that in 48 primary
studies (34.8%) there are no simulations. Those works ac-
count for those solution proposals and validation research
papers already introduced in Subsection 6.1 that use only
good line of argumentation, formal mathematical proofs
and illustrative numerical examples as the research meth-
ods. The only exception is Tiwari et al. (2014), which uses
LandShark robot as the experimental testbed, without re-
lying on simulations.
6.3. Simulation test system
As it was anticipated in the previous section, 90 pri-
mary studies (65.2%) use simulation test systems to vali-
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Table 21: Validation methods.
Validation method Primary studies
Case study Bezzo et al. (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Kwon et al. (2014); Shoukry et al. (2015a); Tan et al. (2015); Xu and Zhu
(2015); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Example Amini et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bi and Zhang (2013); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and
Speranzon (2013); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al. (2012); De Persis and
Tesi (2015); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a); Djouadi et al. (2014); Do et al. (2015); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2013); Fawzi
et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Giani et al. (2013); Gupta et al. (2010); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Huang et al.
(2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014b,a); Kim
and Poor (2011); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Lee
et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015b,c); Liu et al. (2014a); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma et al. (2015); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao
et al. (2014); Mo and Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Pajic et al. (2015); Pasqualetti
et al. (2011, 2013); Qi et al. (2015); Qin et al. (2013); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sajjad et al.
(2015); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Talebi et al. (2012); Tang et al. (2015);
Teixeira et al. (2010, 2015a, 2012, 2015b); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang
and Ren (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xie et al. (2011); Yang et al. (2014); Yuan et al.
(2012); Zhang et al. (2015, 2014); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Experiment Amin et al. (2010); Bezzo et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2015a); Pajic et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a); Teixeira et al.
(2015b); Tiwari et al. (2014)
Mathematical proof Amin et al. (2010); Bai et al. (2015); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2014); Bi and Zhang (2014); Bopardikar and
Speranzon (2013); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b);
D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Giani et al.
(2013); Gupta et al. (2010); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014b, 2015);
Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon and Hwang (2013a); Kwon et al. (2014);
Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015b,c); Liu et al. (2014b, 2015b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao
et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Naghnaeian et al. (2015);
Pajic et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Qi et al. (2015); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rhouma et al. (2015);
Sajjad et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015b); Soltan et al. (2015);
Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2014); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2010,
2012, 2015b); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang and Ren (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015);
Weimer et al. (2014); Xu and Zhu (2015); Xue et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Zhang et al. (2015,
2014); Zhu et al. (2013)
Simulation Amin et al. (2010); Amini et al. (2015); Anwar et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bezzo et al. (2014); Bi and Zhang
(2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015);
Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al. (2012); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015);
Djouadi et al. (2014); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush
and Mart́ınez (2013); Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al. (2015); Hammad et al. (2015b,a); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al.
(2014); Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim
et al. (2014b,a, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon et al. (2014); Li et al.
(2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a,b,c, 2015a,b, 2011); Ma et al. (2015); Manandhar et al.
(2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Mishra et al. (2015a); Mo et al. (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Nudell
et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2011, 2013); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al.
(2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and Saad
(2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Soltan
et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2015, 2014); Teixeira et al. (2010); Valenzuela et al. (2013);
Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Wei
and Kundur (2015); Xie et al. (2011); Xu and Zhu (2015); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Yu and Chin
(2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Zhang et al. (2015); Zhang and Sankar (2015); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Sound argument Amin et al. (2009); Amini et al. (2015); Anwar et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013); Bezzo et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang
(2013); Bobba et al. (2010); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al.
(2012); Djouadi et al. (2014); Do et al. (2015); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Gu et al. (2015); Hammad et al.
(2015b,a); Huang et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim et al. (2014a); Kim
and Poor (2011); Kwon and Hwang (2013b); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a,c,
2015a); Ma et al. (2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay
et al. (2013); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2011); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rawat and Bajracharya
(2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015a); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Smith (2015); Tajer et al.
(2011); Tan et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015a); Tiwari et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015);
Wang et al. (2014); Wei and Kundur (2015); Xie et al. (2011); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016); Yuan et al.
(2012); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang and Sankar (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015); Zonouz et al.
(2012)
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Table 22: Matpower test cases.
Matpower test case Primary studies
33-bus | 69-bus RTS Anwar et al. (2015)
39-bus New England system Giani et al. (2013); Hammad et al. (2015b,a); Liu et al. (2014b, 2015a,b); Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay et al.
(2013); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Wang et al. (2014); Wei and Kundur (2015)
IEEE 4-bus Esmalifalak et al. (2011); Huang et al. (2011); Tan et al. (2015)
IEEE 9-bus Bobba et al. (2010); Hao et al. (2015); Liu et al. (2011); Manandhar et al. (2014); Ozay et al. (2013);
Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Talebi et al. (2012); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2014)
IEEE 14-bus Bi and Zhang (2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Davis
et al. (2012); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Esmalifalak et al. (2011); Fawzi et al. (2014); Gu et al. (2015);
Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014b,a,
2015); Kosut et al. (2011); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang (2014); Liu et al. (2015a,b, 2011); Ozay et al.
(2013); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015);
Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Tan et al. (2014); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Xie
et al. (2011); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012)
IEEE 24-bus RTS/RTS-79/RTS-96 Davis et al. (2012); Giani et al. (2013); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2015b); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-
Garcia (2011); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Zhang and Sankar (2015); Zonouz et al.
(2012)
IEEE 30-bus Bobba et al. (2010); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a); Esmalifalak et al. (2012,
2011); Giani et al. (2013); Kim and Poor (2011); Liu et al. (2015b, 2011); Ozay et al. (2013); Rahman
et al. (2014); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Talebi et al. (2012); Yamaguchi et al.
(2014); Yang et al. (2016, 2014)
IEEE 57-bus Bi and Zhang (2014); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Giani et al. (2013); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al.
(2014); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Kim and Poor (2011); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015b); Mishra et al. (2015a);
Ozay et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014)
IEEE 118-bus Bi and Zhang (2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Deka et al. (2014); Giani et al. (2013); Hendrickx et al. (2014);
Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014b, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Li and Wang
(2014); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015a,b, 2011); Ozay et al. (2013); Pasqualetti et al. (2011, 2013); Rahman
et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Soltan et al. (2015); Tan et al. (2015); Valenzuela
et al. (2013); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al.
(2014); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2016, 2014)
IEEE 300-bus Bobba et al. (2010); Giani et al. (2013); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim and Poor (2011); Liu et al. (2011);
Ozay et al. (2013); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2014)
PJM 5-bus system Esmalifalak et al. (2013); Jia et al. (2014); Ma et al. (2015)
Polish system (2383|...|3375)-bus Giani et al. (2013); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015b); Ozay et al. (2013); Soltan et al.
(2015); Yamaguchi et al. (2014)
WSCC 9 bus Amini et al. (2015); Davis et al. (2012); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Sanjab and Saad (2015)
Table 23: Primary studies adopting simulation testbeds different from Matpower.
Various testbes Amin et al. (2010); Bezzo et al. (2014); Cárdenas et al. (2011); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014);
Hammad et al. (2015a); Jones et al. (2014); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014c); Miao and
Zhu (2014); Mo et al. (2015); Nudell et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015b); Shoukry and Tabuada
(2014); Smith (2015); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Xu and Zhu (2015)
Polish system (2383/../13375)-bus
IEEE 9-bus (case9)
IEEE 24-bus RTS (case24_ieee_rts)
















Fig. 28: Distribution of power grid test cases
date the presented results. The mapping of each study to
the adopted simulation test system is reported in Tables 22
and 23.
The main tool used by researchers on security of smart
grid is Matpower, which is an open-source Matlab-based
power system simulation package (Zimmerman et al., 2011).
The distribution of its test cases (Zimmerman and Murillo-
Sánchez, 2016) is shown in Fig. 28.
From Table 22 it is evident that the works studying ap-
plications to electricity market (see Table 3) use only small
Matpower test cases, namely a modified 5-bus PJM ex-
ample case (case5), a 4-bus example case from Grainger &
Stevenson13 (case4gs), IEEE 14-bus case (case14), IEEE
30-bus case (case ieee30) and its variants, 39-bus New Eng-
land case (case39), IEEE 118-bus case (case118), IEEE
300-bus case (case300), and an implementation of WSCC
9-bus (Sauer et al., 2017) case.
Generally speaking, the most used Matpower test
cases are the small ones, IEEE 14-bus case and IEEE 118-
bus case, used through all the considered power grid do-
mains, while the bigger Polish system test cases (such as
case3375wp) found their way just in 7 works, all in the
power transmission domain.
The primary studies that are using testbeds different
from Matpower are listed in Table 23. Two-area Kun-
13In some works it is referred to as IEEE 4-bus.
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dur system test case (Kundur, 1994), whose parameters
can be found in Matlab Power System Toolbox (Chow
and Cheung, 1992), is used to study power generation in
Vrakopoulou et al. (2015), Hammad et al. (2015a), Nudell
et al. (2015). Other typical test cases implemented in Mat-
lab include an irrigation system consisting of a cascade
of a number of canal pools, as presented in Amin et al.
(2013), which is used in Amin et al. (2010), Smith (2015);
an unstable batch reactor system presented by Walsh et al.
(2002), which is a fourth order unstable linear system with
two inputs, employed in Shoukry et al. (2013), Miao and
Zhu (2014); Tennessee Eastman process control system
model and associated multi-loop proportional-integral con-
trol law, as proposed by Ricker (1993), that is adopted in
Cárdenas et al. (2011), Miao and Zhu (2014), Mo et al.
(2015); PHANToM Premium 1.5A (Taati et al., 2008),
that is a haptic device from SensAble Technologies, used
in a simulation setup in Liu et al. (2014c); finally, a ro-
torcraft in a cruise flight (Narendra and Tripathi, 1973) is
simulated in Kwon and Hwang (2013a,b).
The remaining primary studies listed in Table 23 use ad
hoc simulation test cases to validate their results. Specifi-
cally, Kwon et al. (2014) use Monte Carlo simulation with
1000 runs on an unmanned aerial system navigation sys-
tem integrating the inertial navigation system and the
global positioning system implemented in Matlab.
D’Innocenzo et al. (2015) perform Matlab/Simulink sim-
ulations on the multi-hop wireless network deployed in a
room to connect the temperature sensor to the variable-
air-volume box, which is positioned nearby the room. Also
Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014) perform Matlab/Simulink
simulations on a single-input single-output (SISO) system;
it deals with a velocity control of a single joint robotic arm
over a communication network. Bezzo et al. (2014) use
robot operating system14 (ROS) based simulator emulat-
ing electromechanical and dynamical behavior of the real
robot. In Park et al. (2014) simulations are carried out us-
ing a simple model of air traffic operations. Shoukry and
Tabuada (2014) use an UGV model implemented in Mat-
lab. Jones et al. (2014) simulate a train, which uses an
electronically-controlled pneumatic braking system mod-
eled as a classical hybrid automaton. In the research line
of Shoukry et al. (2015b), the authors developed a “theory
solver in Matlab and interfaced it with the pseudo-Boolean
SAT solver SAT4J” (Shoukry et al., 2015), where the sim-
ulations are performed on linear dynamical systems with a
variable number of sensors and system states. Finally, Xu
and Zhu (2015) perform Matlab/Simulink simulations on
a small-scale unmanned helicopter whose dynamic model
is linearized at its hovering point (Cai et al., 2011).
From the analysed data it is evident that most of the
works still use relatively small simulation test cases to val-
idate the proposed results, while more challenging exam-
ples can be found only in the power networks application
14http://www.ros.org
domain, with some simulations performed on Matpower
Polish system test cases. Despite research on CPS security
in this domain appears quite mature, a benchmark is still
missing.
6.4. Repeatability and availability of replication package
The possibility of reproducing the evaluation or valida-
tion results provided by the authors is called repeatability,
while the possibility of exploring changes to experiment
parameters is known as workability. The repeatability pro-
cess is a good scientific practice (Bonnet et al., 2011). The
so called Artifact Evaluation Process15 is used in a number
of conferences in computer science, and a similar concept
of repeatability evaluation of computational elements has
been introduced in cyber-physical systems domain in 2014
ACM Hybrid Systems Computation and Control (HSCC)
conference16. However, such practice is rather new to re-
search communities adopting automatic control perspec-
tive on security of CPS: we found no primary study with
a replication package. Thus, we have isolated the infor-
mation concerning the availability of a replication pack-
age and extended the simple dimension provided in Yuan
et al. (2014) in a way that repeatability is considered high
when the authors provide enough details about (i) the
steps performed for evaluating or validating the study, (ii)
the developed or used software, (iii) the used or simulated
testbed, if any, and (iv) any other additional resource, in
a way that interested third parties can be able to repeat
the evaluation or validation of the study. Otherwise, we
have low repeatability.
Such high-level definition of repeatability values has en-
sured that the primary studies using standard test systems
from Section 6.3 and well known experimental testbeds
have received high values of repeatability, where steps per-
formed in their experiments, case studies and/or simula-
tion examples have been described with enough details.
On the other hand, the usage of some ad hoc simulation
test system has caused some low values of repeatability
assigned. As shown in Fig. 29, 84 studies (60.9%) have a
high repeatability value, and 12 studies (8.7%) have a low
repeatability score. As a note, we did not have the pos-
sibility to evaluate the repeatability of 42 studies (30.4%)
since they do not present any experiment, case study or
simulation example.
Overall, we advocate the improving of repeatability
and workability of computational results of the papers by
adopting the best practices of repeatability process and
creating related replication packages, because we strongly
believe in the usefulness of repeatability to empower oth-
ers to build on top of the contributions of a paper17 and












Fig. 29: Distribution of primary studies by repeatability
7. Implications for Future Research
We discussed potential future research trends and chal-
lenges for CPS security from automatic control perspective
throughout this paper in the context of the various discus-
sions of results obtained in our systematic mapping study
of the first ten years of the field (Sections 4, 5, and 6);
in the following we present how research on security in
cyber-physical realm has evolved since 2016 and provide
more general observations about implications for future
research.
First of all, CPS security is a relatively young research
domain that is experiencing a strong academic (and in-
dustrial) interest in the very few years, as seen from the
publication trend reported in Figure 2, and both Euro-
pean Commission and NSF are very oriented in financing
research in this area. From the data obtained in the sys-
tematic mapping part of our study it can be inferred that
the potential of the developed results and methodologies in
addressing realistic emerging problems in several applica-
tion domains (first of all, power systems) is very promising.
As a consequence it is predictable that CPS security will
be a “hot topic” for the forthcoming years.
Based on the informal analysis of several notable works
available in literature from 2016 to mid 2018, we can affirm
that the increasing trend did not stop. In fact, also if we
consider CPS dealing with cyber attacks with a generic dy-
namical systems modeling framework only, a huge amount
of works can be found, as for example Mo and Sinopoli
(2016), Yuan et al. (2016), Zheng et al. (2016), Weer-
akkody et al. (2016), Bai et al. (2017a), Ding et al. (2017a),
Ding et al. (2017b), Jin et al. (2017), Kung et al. (2017),
Pajic et al. (2017b), Chen et al. (2018b,c), just to cite a
few. Another large amount of works can be found if we
only focus our attention on attack detection and identifi-
cation, and state estimation (Mo and Garone, 2016; Mur-
guia and Ruths, 2016; Bai et al., 2017b; Mishra et al.,
2017; Li et al., 2017b, 2018b; Chen et al., 2017; Shi et al.,
2017; Shoukry and Tabuada, 2016; Shoukry et al., 2017,
2018; Pajic et al., 2017a; Weerakkody and Sinopoli, 2016;
Weerakkody et al., 2017; Ao et al., 2018; Forti et al.,
2018; Kim et al., 2018; Lee et al., 2018; Nakahira and
Mo, 2018). It is worth to emphasize that one of the path
followed by researcher to improve the research in CPS
security consists on considering more accurate, but also
more complex, models such as stochastic, nonlinear and
delayed systems (Liu et al., 2016a; Hu et al., 2016; Wang
et al., 2017; Ding et al., 2018b). We should also note
that some of the aforementioned works are extensions of
the research lines considered by our systematic mapping,
since Shoukry and Tabuada (2016), Bai et al. (2017a),
Mishra et al. (2017), Lee et al. (2018) are clearly related
to Shoukry and Tabuada (2014), Bai et al. (2015), Mishra
et al. (2015b), Lee et al. (2015), respectively, while both
Pajic et al. (2017a,b) are linked to Pajic et al. (2015), and
Shoukry et al. (2017, 2018) are associated with Shoukry
et al. (2015b).
From a modeling point of view, while Gaussian model
of noise (used e.g. in Hu et al. (2016), Liu et al. (2016a), Mo
and Sinopoli (2016), Mo and Garone (2016), Weerakkody
and Sinopoli (2016), Weerakkody et al. (2016), Zheng et al.
(2016), Bai et al. (2017a,b), Ding et al. (2017a,b, 2018b),
Chen et al. (2018c,b), Kung et al. (2017), Mishra et al.
(2017), Murguia and Ruths (2016), Li et al. (2017b, 2018b),
Shi et al. (2017), Wang et al. (2017), Forti et al. (2018))
still clearly dominates the scene, the bounded model (found
in Pajic et al. (2017a,b), Shoukry et al. (2017, 2018), Kim
et al. (2018), Lee et al. (2018), Nakahira and Mo (2018))
is considered more and more often. This fact indicates
an increasing attention to the aspects of robustness of the
proposed solutions, and that the model-based methods and
techniques for enforcing security in the cyber-physical do-
main are acquiring certain maturity.
Another confirmation concerns a cornerstone applica-
tion of the CPS security: power grids. Indeed, due to
the integration of information technology and the vulner-
ability of communication networks, power grids are ex-
tremely exposed to cyber-attacks. Thus researchers are
still very involved in this context, see for example Ao
et al. (2016), Esnaola et al. (2016), Farraj et al. (2016),
Isozaki et al. (2016), Li et al. (2016b, 2017d), Liu et al.
(2016b, 2017), Sanjab and Saad (2016), Ye et al. (2016),
Zhang and Sankar (2016), Anwar et al. (2017), Ashok et al.
(2017), Bretas et al. (2017), Deng et al. (2017a), Giraldo
et al. (2017a), Liu and Li (2017c,a), Srikantha and Kun-
dur (2016), Rahman et al. (2017), Yang et al. (2017a,b),
Zhang et al. (2017), Zhao et al. (2017b), Amini et al.
(2018), Ashok et al. (2018), Attia et al. (2018), Chen et al.
(2018a), Lin et al. (2018a), Taha et al. (2018), Wei et al.
(2018), and many others. These works mainly consider
IEEE bus systems as testbeds to simulate the method-
ology they propose. Much less works consider different
testbeds, such as a hybrid automaton model of DC micro-
grids (Beg et al., 2017), or simulators built by the authors,
like the MAS-SIM (Gai et al., 2017) (that unfortunately
at the moment is not publicly available for independent
use or just replication purposes) and the PowerWorld (Li
et al., 2016a, 2017a). Also novel algorithms that are val-
idated by experiments on a physical system, as the case
of the 16-bus power system testbed in Tan et al. (2017),
are still rare. This fact highlights a significant need to
evaluate new concepts and vulnerabilities by experimental
facilities, as those surveyed by Cintuglu et al. (2017). The
theoretical research on security of power grids is expanding
in several directions, such as considering the consequences
of false data injection attacks on an AC state estimation,
by analyzing the results of a DC-based optimization prob-
lem (Liang et al., 2016), or dealing with reduced amount
of information available to an attacker when construct-
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ing an undetectable attack vector (Chin et al., 2017; Liu
and Li, 2017b). Also Markovian models to represent the
power system and the attack has been under investigation
in the last years, as in the case of Huang et al. (2016), Xi-
ang et al. (2017), Karimipour and Dinavahi (2018). Other
researchers are exploring completely different approaches,
such as consensus (Zhao et al., 2017a), and considering
specific categories of attacks, as part of the larger class of
deception attacks, like coordinated cyber-physical attacks
(CCPAs) (Deng et al., 2017c), and control-related attacks
(Lin et al., 2018b). Notably, some of the named works
on smart grid security are the follow up of the research
lines already seen in our systematic mapping: for instance,
Huang et al. (2016), Sanjab and Saad (2016), Amini et al.
(2018) are the journal versions of the respective conference
works (Huang et al., 2011; Sanjab and Saad, 2015; Amini
et al., 2015).
An increasing trend, with respect to the period 2006–
2015, can be seen in networked CPSs (Ding et al., 2016;
Zhang et al., 2016; Satchidanandan and Kumar, 2017; Sun
et al., 2018; Teixeira et al., 2018). Several aspects have
been investigated on this topic, with paper focusing on
stability (De Persis and Tesi, 2016; Dolk et al., 2017; Feng
and Tesi, 2017; Pang et al., 2018), state estimation (Keller
et al., 2016; Guo et al., 2017, 2018; Miao et al., 2017;
Tsiamis et al., 2017), and output tracking control (Pang
et al., 2016). Also in this case, one of the research direc-
tions is taking into account more complex models, such as
Markovian models, addressing stability and state estima-
tion problems (Cetinkaya et al., 2017, 2018; Ding et al.,
2017c; Zhang et al., 2018). Furthermore, although we
would have excluded papers on sensor networks due to
our selection criteria, it is worth to mention few papers
to underline that CPS security with focus on wireless sen-
sor networks is an active research area (Li et al., 2017c,
2018a; Ma et al., 2017). The same also applies to works
on consensus (Senejohnny et al., 2017; Zhao et al., 2017a).
Also here several results from research lines presented in
our systematic mapping are spread through new pubblica-
tions, with e.g. Keller et al. (2016), Cetinkaya et al. (2017)
following Rhouma et al. (2015), Cetinkaya et al. (2015), re-
spectively, and Ding et al. (2017c), Li et al. (2017c) both
linked to Li et al. (2015b).
Differently from networked control systems, CPS secu-
rity with unmanned aerial vehicle applications did not ex-
plode until now, despite some good papers can be found in
literature (Abbaspour et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2016). This
is true also for works that focus specifically on industrial
control systems (Urbina et al., 2016b; Garcia et al., 2017;
Huang et al., 2018; Paridari et al., 2018), also proposing
a testbed to understand the impact of cyber and physi-
cal attacks on a particular type of industrial control sys-
tems, i.e. water treatment system (Adepu and Mathur,
2016; Mathur and Tippenhauer, 2016), on cryptography
for CPS, which has been further investigated in recent
years considering for example both fully and semi-homomor-
phic encryption techniques for secuirity of CPS (Kim et al.,
2016; Farokhi et al., 2017), and on applications of formal
methods to reason about CPS and cyber-physical attacks
(Lanotte et al., 2017).
Novel directions have also started, exploring different
fields other than the ones described in this paper. In par-
ticular, security in teleoperated robotics rised up too, ad-
dresing vulnerability issues against different type of cyber
attacks, as for example static malignant content modifica-
tion attacks (MCoMA) (Dong et al., 2016), or focusing on
experimental analysis on specific systems, as for the ad-
vanced teleoperated robotic surgery system considered in
Bonaci et al. (2015), although its journal version is still in
preparation.
A very interesting aspect that came up analyzing pa-
pers of the last years is the increasing consideration of
data-driven methods. Indeed, all the approaches described
above can be affected by issues that are not always con-
sidered during the definition of the modeling framework.
For example, it can be difficult, in general, to know a pri-
ori what type of attacks may be inserted into the system,
moreover it can also be difficult to derive a mathemati-
cal description of the system that is based on the physics
when the system is extremely complex. As experience
demonstrates, e.g. in the context of energy efficient con-
trol of building automation systems (Smarra et al., 2018),
in many CPS application domains the cost of modeling is
much larger than the improvement margin in terms of effi-
ciency/cost/performance. In this scenario, the data-driven
approaches introduce an important novelty. In the last
years, this topic attracted researcher’s interest, and few
papers are available in different domains, as for example
anomaly detection for CPSs (Shi et al., 2018), detection of
cyber attacks against vehicles (Loukas et al., 2018), attack
detection on unmanned aerial vehicles (Abbaspour et al.,
2016) and smart grids (Ozay et al., 2016).
In the future data-driven methods will play a key role
to improve the modeling framework of CPSs and attacks,
and to help the system to correct itself based on the data
generated on-line by the system, leveraging the learning
potential of the machine learning. Coupled with classical
modeling techniques they could also be used to come up
with an unified paradigm to address CPS security.
8. Related Work
Recently, we have seen a large increase in the surveys of
CPS focusing exclusively on security and/or privacy from
different points of view, and a recent survey by Giraldo
et al. (2017b) has provided a useful overview of 32 pa-
pers (including the early preliminary version of this work)
categorized by application domains (such as smart grids
(He and Yan, 2016; Cintuglu et al., 2017), medical devices
(Rushanan et al., 2014; Camara et al., 2015; AlTawy and
Youssef, 2016), industrial control systems (Stouffer et al.,
2015; McLaughlin et al., 2016; Urbina et al., 2016a), man-
ufacturing (Wells et al., 2014; Pan et al., 2017; Zeltmann
et al., 2016), and intelligent transportation systems), the
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addressed attacks and defenses, research trends, network
security, security-level implementation, and computational
strategies. Notably, among all 32 works analysed by Gi-
raldo et al. (2017b), there was only one other systematic
study, developed by Nguyen et al. (2017), which had a
very different scope from ours, with a very specialized fo-
cus on model-based security engineering. Nguyen et al.
(2017) employed the same commonly accepted guidelines
reported in Petersen et al. (2015) and Kitchenham and
Charters (2007) to show how software models can help in
design and verification of CPS.
Later on, two new surveys on false data injection at-
tacks on state estimation in power systems, both sum-
marising the theoretical basis of such attacks, their impact
in case of success and the defense strategies against them,
were conducted by Deng et al. (2017b) and Liang et al.
(2017).
Before them, the cyber-physical systems security within
the smart grid domain has been reviewed by Mo et al.
(2012) and by Sridhar et al. (2012).
The work from Mo et al. (2012) is a good starting point
to face the area of CPS security since it gives a broad
overview on cyber and system-theoretic approaches to se-
curity and shows how a combination of both of them to-
gether can provide better security level than traditional
methods. The provided example describes defense against
replay attack following secure control (Cárdenas et al.,
2008a) method.
The article from Sridhar et al. (2012) is more domain-
specific. Since power system is functionally divided into
generation, transmission, and distribution, the survey con-
siders cyber vulnerabilities and security solutions for each
of the underlying fields. Notably, it deals with a wide range
of (sophisticated) attacks, some bad data detection tech-
niques and mentions attack resilient control. This work
provides also an overview on supporting infrastructure se-
curity, with a look on secure communication, device secu-
rity, security management and awareness, cyber security
evaluation, and intrusion tolerance. All in all, the paper
identifies the importance of combining both power appli-
cation security and supporting infrastructure security into
the risk assessment process and provides a methodology
for impact evaluation. Conclusively, it lists a number of
emerging research challenges in risk modeling and mitiga-
tion, pointing out the importance of attack resilient con-
trol, domain-specific anomaly detection and intrusion tol-
erance.
Lastly, Ding et al. (2018a) surveyed the recent advances
on security control and attack detection for industrial CPS
from a control theory perspective, rising some challenging
issues for the future research.
Finally, we should observe that based on the guidelines
for performing systematic literature reviews from Kitchen-
ham and Charters (2007), all but Nguyen et al. (2017) the
aforementioned articles cannot be considered as a system-
atic literature reviews but as informal literature surveys,
and cannot be compared directly to this mapping study.
9. Conclusions and Future Work
In this work we provided an overview of the state of
the art of research in CPS security enforcing or breach-
ing, considering an automatic control perspective. The
presented survey is based on a well-established empirical
methodology, called systematic mapping, which allowed us
to provide a review that is complete, comprehensive, and
not biased from personal experience.
The main contribution of this paper is a systematic
map that covers the first ten years of research on cyber-
physical security. It provides a statistical summary of im-
portant features in the field, such as targeted applications
and system components, adopted strategies and validation
of results, together with emerging publication trends. The
obtained results permit to find a clear picture of the sate-
of-the-art of a topic of interest, as for example deception
attacks on state estimation in power grids, while remain-
ing aware of a broader picture on the works with similar
characteristics, as for instance deception attacks on state
estimation of a generic cyber-physical system.
Starting from these results, that systematically cover
the evolution of the topic from its beginning, we ana-
lyzed the relevant works on cyber-physical security pub-
lished from 2016 to mid 2018. This allowed us to show,
through empirical evidence, that investigation of cyber-
physical security enforcing or breaching is indeed a very
active and expanding area of research, and emphasize how
the topic evolved, thus providing hints on the weak points
and promising new directions of this appealing research
area.
We believe that this study may inspire researchers with
new research lines, as happened to us. In particular, we got
exposed to the literature on hybrid systems with stochastic
switching, and started our research line on time-inhomoge-
neous Markov jump linear systems with bounded uncer-
tainties on transition probabilities. After having solved
the fundamental problems of stability and optimal control
(Zacchia Lun et al., 2016, 2017), we are now approach-
ing the issues of fault (and attack) detection and isolation.
In the domain of multi-hop control networks, we already
got some exciting results on the topic, providing stabiliz-
ability, and fault detection and isolation conditions for the
networks subject to node failures and malicious attacks
(D’Innocenzo et al., 2016).
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Appendix A. Additional results
This section of appendix provides the results of analysis
of some additional characteristics of our primary studies,
which are not related to CPS security per se, but are still
useful to better understand this scientific area. These im-
portant characteristics are the theoretical foundations and
time-scale models.
Appendix A.1. Theoretical foundation
Because of the intrinsic multidisciplinary nature of cyber-
physical systems, we paid attention also on the theoretical
background on which primary studies are built upon. This
information is particularly useful for the new researchers
who would like to explore this exciting research area. Since
the control systems are at the heart of CPS, and the pro-
vided perspective is that of researchers from the Auto-
matic Control community, it is not a surprise that control
theory is used in every study considered in our mapping
study. The mapping of other theoretical backgrounds to
each primary study is provided in the Table A.24. As a
reference to the related application fields, see also Table 3.
The study of graphs is the most used theoretical foun-
dation, found in 38 studies (27.5%). Graph theory (see
e.g. Kleinberg and Tardos (2006), Bondy and Murty (1976))
is well suited to represent any kind of topological informa-
tion, and, in fact, it is used in 29 studies on security of
power transmission networks.
To asymptotically analyze the intrinsic difficulty of prob-
lems and algorithms, and to decide which of these are
likely to be tractable, computational complexity theory (see
e.g. Horst and Pardalos (1995), Kleinberg and Tardos (2006))
is employed in 16 works, most of them within the field of
power transmission.
Information theory (see e.g. Cover and Thomas (2006))
is used in 12 works18, most of which treating the security
of generic linear dynamical systems.
The methods of dimensionality reduction (such as prin-
cipal component analysis) and of latent variable separa-
tion (e.g. independent component analysis) from machine
learning and statistics provide a way to understand and
visualize the structure of complex data sets (see e.g. Lee
and Verleysen (2007)). They are used in 7 works, whose
application domain is power grids and generic dynamical
systems.
Other methods of linear dimensionality reduction are
used for simultaneous sensing and compression of finite-
dimensional vectors. Providing means for recovering sparse
high-dimensional signals from highly incomplete measure-
ments by using efficient algorithms (Eldar and Kutyniok,
2012), compressed sensing is applied in 7 works on power
grids and linear dynamical systems.
18The reference Gupta et al. (2010) is related to Gupta et al.
(2011), which is a part of the same research line.
Starting from 2014, typical formal methods concepts
of signal temporal logic (STL, which is a rigorous formal-
ism for specifying desired behaviors of continuous signals
(Maler and Nickovic, 2004)) and satisfiability modulo the-
ories (SMT) (Barrett et al., 2009) have found their way in
3 studies on CPS security, with applications to anomaly
detection and resilient state estimation in generic cyber-
physical systems and power grids.
The mathematical optimization (see e.g. Horst and Parda-
los (1995), Rao (2009)) is used in several studies and appli-
cation areas. The sub-fields of optimization found in pri-
mary studies include convex optimization (21 studies), lin-
ear programming (16 studies), dynamic programming and
integer programming (both appeared in 11 studies), non-
linear programming (6 studies), quadratic programming
(adopted in 7 works) and semidefinite programming (3
studies).
The most used sub-field of game theory (Başar and Ols-
der, 1999), found in 8 primary studies, is zero-sum game,
which do not allow for any cooperation between the play-
ers, since what one player gains incurs a loss to the other
player. As expected, all considered games belong to a class
of continuous-time infinite dynamic games, also known as
differential games, wherein the evolution of the state is
described by a differential equation and the players act
throughout a time interval.
Appendix A.2. Time-scale model
The dynamic system behavior can be modeled via dif-
ferent time-scale models, such as continuous, discrete and
hybrid. In the case of the (quasi-)steady state assumption,
the system is treated as (quasi-)static, and the time-scale
model is named accordingly. In particular, quasi-static
analysis is mostly chosen for addressing control architec-
tures like SCADA, which provide steady-state set-points
to inner control loops. The mapping of each primary study
to related time-scale model is reported in Table A.25, while
the related distribution is shown in Figure A.30.
The quasi-static model is used in 55 studies (39,9%), all
but one (Mo and Sinopoli, 2015) of them concerned with
power systems state estimation, while there are 26 studies
(18.8%) considering continuous time, 65 (47.1%) discrete
time, and only 5 considering both continuous and discrete
time, only 3 of which actually using hybrid time (Zhu and
Başar, 2015; Zhu et al., 2013; Jones et al., 2014).
Appendix B. Threats to Validity
We assessed the level of quality of our study by ap-
plying the quality checklist proposed by Petersen et al.
(2015). The goal of Petersen’s quality checklist is to assess
an objective quality rating for systematic mapping stud-
ies. According to the metrics defined in Petersen’s quality
40
Table A.24: Theoretical foundations.
Theoretical foundation Primary studies
Compressed sensing Fawzi et al. (2014); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Kim and Poor (2011); Liu et al. (2014a); Ozay
et al. (2013); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014)
Computational complexity theory Bobba et al. (2010); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Giani et al. (2013); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Kosut et al.
(2011); Li et al. (2015a,b); Liu et al. (2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Mishra et al. (2015a); Pasqualetti et al.
(2013); Soltan et al. (2015); Xu and Zhu (2015); Yang et al. (2014)
Control theory Amin et al. (2009, 2010); Amini et al. (2015); Anwar et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Barreto et al. (2013);
Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015, 2014); Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Bopardikar
and Speranzon (2013); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Chen
et al. (2015); Choi and Xie (2013); Davis et al. (2012); De Persis and Tesi (2015); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b);
D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Do et al. (2015); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Eyisi
and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Giani et al. (2013); Gu et al.
(2015); Gupta et al. (2010); Hammad et al. (2015b,a); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Huang
et al. (2011); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Jones et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim
et al. (2014b,a, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kosut et al.
(2011); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon et al. (2014); Lee et al. (2015); Li et al. (2015a); Li and Wang
(2014); Li et al. (2015b,c); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a,b,c, 2015a,b, 2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Ma
et al. (2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao et al. (2014); Mishra et al. (2014, 2015a,b);
Mo and Sinopoli (2012, 2015); Mo et al. (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Naghnaeian et al.
(2015); Nudell et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pajic et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Pasqualetti et al. (2011,
2013); Qi et al. (2015); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Rawat
and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sajjad et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al. (2014); Sanjab and
Saad (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015a,b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014);
Smith (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tajer et al. (2011); Talebi
et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2015, 2014); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2010, 2015a, 2012, 2015b); Tiwari
et al. (2014); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al.
(2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Wei and Kundur (2015);
Weimer et al. (2014); Xie et al. (2011); Xu and Zhu (2015); Xue et al. (2014); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang
et al. (2016, 2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al. (2015, 2014);
Zhang and Sankar (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015); Zhu et al. (2013); Zonouz et al.
(2012)
Convex optimization Amin et al. (2009); Bi and Zhang (2013); Fawzi et al. (2014); Hao et al. (2015); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Jia
et al. (2014); Kim et al. (2014a); Kosut et al. (2011); Liu et al. (2014a); Miao et al. (2014); Mo and Sinopoli
(2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pajic et al. (2015); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Sanjab and Saad (2015);
Teixeira et al. (2010); Vuković and Dán (2014); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xie
et al. (2011); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Dynamic programming Amin et al. (2009); Barreto et al. (2013); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2015); Deka et al. (2015a,b);
Li et al. (2015b); Liu et al. (2014c); Ma et al. (2015); Mo et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2013)
Formal methods Jones et al. (2014); Rahman et al. (2014); Shoukry et al. (2015b)
Graph theory Bi and Zhang (2014); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi et al. (2014); Giani
et al. (2013); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013);
Kim et al. (2014b, 2015); Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Lo and Ansari (2013); Mishra et al.
(2015a); Nudell et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2011, 2013); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Sajjad
et al. (2015); Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010);
Tajer et al. (2011); Vuković and Dán (2014); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014);
Wei and Kundur (2015); Xue et al. (2014); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2014); Zhang and Sankar
(2015); Zhu et al. (2013); Zonouz et al. (2012)
Integer programming Bi and Zhang (2014); Giani et al. (2013); Hendrickx et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2015b); Mishra et al. (2015a);
Pajic et al. (2015); Shoukry et al. (2015b); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Vuković et al. (2012); Yamaguchi et al.
(2014); Yuan et al. (2012)
Information theory Bai et al. (2015); Fawzi et al. (2014); Gupta et al. (2010); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Mishra et al. (2014,
2015b); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Shoukry et al. (2015a); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tang et al.
(2015); Xu and Zhu (2015); Yuan and Mo (2015)
Linear programming Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2013); Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Poor (2011); Liu
et al. (2014c); Lo and Ansari (2013); Mo et al. (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Pajic et al.
(2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015b); Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yuan et al. (2012); Zhu and
Başar (2015)
Machine learning and statistics Anwar et al. (2015); Esmalifalak et al. (2011); Jones et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a); Tiwari et al. (2014);
Valenzuela et al. (2013); Yu and Chin (2015)
Nonlinerar programming Kim et al. (2014b); Kwon et al. (2014); Li and Wang (2014); Nudell et al. (2015); Qin et al. (2013);
Vrakopoulou et al. (2015)
Nonzero-sum (differential) game Barreto et al. (2013); Sanjab and Saad (2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Quadratic programming Kim et al. (2015); Liu et al. (2015a); Shoukry et al. (2015b); Weerakkody and Sinopoli (2015); Xu and Zhu
(2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015)
Semidefinite programming Amin et al. (2009); Mo et al. (2015); Weimer et al. (2014)
Stackelberg game Sanjab and Saad (2015); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014)
Zero-sum (differential) game Esmalifalak et al. (2013); Gupta et al. (2010); Li et al. (2015b); Liu et al. (2014c); Ma et al. (2015); Miao
and Zhu (2014); Shoukry et al. (2013); Zhu and Başar (2015)
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Table A.25: Time-scale models.
Time-scale model Primary studies
Continuous Amin et al. (2010); Barreto et al. (2013); Bezzo et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); D’Innocenzo et al. (2015); Djouadi
et al. (2014); Foroush and Mart́ınez (2013); Giani et al. (2013); Hammad et al. (2015b,a); Jones et al. (2014); Lee et al.
(2015); Li et al. (2015c); Liu et al. (2014b); Nudell et al. (2015); Pasqualetti et al. (2013); Sajjad et al. (2015); Smith
(2015); Tan et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2015a, 2012); Vrakopoulou et al. (2015); Wei and Kundur (2015); Xue et al.
(2014); Zhu and Başar (2015); Zhu et al. (2013)
Discrete Amin et al. (2009); Amini et al. (2015); Bai et al. (2015); Befekadu et al. (2015); Bezzo et al. (2014); Bopardikar and Sper-
anzon (2013); Cárdenas et al. (2011); Cetinkaya et al. (2015); Chen et al. (2015); De Persis and Tesi (2015); D’Innocenzo
et al. (2015); Do et al. (2015); Eyisi and Koutsoukos (2014); Fawzi et al. (2014); Gu et al. (2015); Gupta et al. (2010);
Huang et al. (2011); Kogiso and Fujita (2015); Kontouras et al. (2015); Kwon and Hwang (2013b,a); Kwon et al. (2014);
Li et al. (2015a,b); Liu et al. (2014c); Ma et al. (2015); Manandhar et al. (2014); Miao and Zhu (2014); Miao et al. (2014);
Mishra et al. (2014, 2015b); Mo and Sinopoli (2012); Mo et al. (2015); Naghnaeian et al. (2015); Ozay et al. (2013); Pajic
et al. (2015); Park et al. (2014); Qi et al. (2015); Rawat and Bajracharya (2015); Rhouma et al. (2015); Sanandaji et al.
(2014); Shoukry et al. (2013, 2015a,b); Shoukry and Tabuada (2014); Sundaram et al. (2010); Tajer et al. (2011); Talebi
et al. (2012); Tang et al. (2015); Teixeira et al. (2012, 2015b); Tiwari et al. (2014); Vuković and Dán (2014); Weerakkody
and Sinopoli (2015); Weimer et al. (2014); Xu and Zhu (2015); Yang et al. (2016, 2014); Yuan and Mo (2015); Zhang et al.
(2015, 2014); Zhu and Mart́ınez (2014); Zhu and Başar (2015); Zhu et al. (2013); Zonouz et al. (2012)
(Quasi-)static Anwar et al. (2015); Bi and Zhang (2013, 2014); Bobba et al. (2010); Chakhchoukh and Ishii (2015); Choi and Xie (2013);
Davis et al. (2012); Deka et al. (2014, 2015a,b); Esmalifalak et al. (2012, 2011, 2013); Giani et al. (2013); Hao et al. (2015);
Hendrickx et al. (2014); Hug and Giampapa (2012); Jia et al. (2014); Kim and Tong (2013); Kim et al. (2014b,a, 2015);
Kim and Poor (2011); Kosut et al. (2011); Li and Wang (2014); Liang et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2014a, 2015a,b, 2011); Lo
and Ansari (2013); Mishra et al. (2015a); Mo and Sinopoli (2015); Mohsenian-Rad and Leon-Garcia (2011); Pasqualetti
et al. (2011); Qin et al. (2013); Rahman et al. (2014); Rahman and Mohsenian-Rad (2012); Sanjab and Saad (2015);
Sedghi and Jonckheere (2015); Soltan et al. (2015); Sou et al. (2014); Talebi et al. (2012); Tan et al. (2014); Teixeira
et al. (2010); Valenzuela et al. (2013); Vuković et al. (2012); Wang et al. (2014); Wang and Ren (2014); Xie et al. (2011);
Yamaguchi et al. (2014); Yang et al. (2014); Yu and Chin (2015); Yuan et al. (2012); Zhang and Sankar (2015)
Fig. A.30: Distribution of primary studies by time-scale model
checklist, we achieve an outstanding score of 54%, defined
as the ratio of the number of actions taken in compari-
son to the total number of actions reported in the quality
checklist. The quality score of our study is far beyond the
scores obtained by existing systematic mapping studies in
the literature, which have a distribution with a median of
33% and 48% as absolute maximum value.
Overall, the high quality of our study has being en-
sured by producing a detailed research protocol document
in which all of its steps have been subject to three external
reviews by independent researchers (see Section 3) and by
conducting our study by following the well-accepted and
updated guidelines of systematic review/mapping study
(Kitchenham and Charters, 2007; Petersen et al., 2015).
In the following we detail the main threats to validity of
our study and how we alleviated them.
Conclusion validity. Conclusion validity refers to the re-
lationship between the extracted data, the produced map,
and the resulting findings (Wohlin et al., 2012).
In order to mitigate possible conclusion validities, first
of all we defined the search terms systematically and we
document procedures in our research protocol, so that our
research can be replicated by other researchers interested
in the topic. Moreover, we documented and used a rig-
orously defined data extraction form, so that we could
reduce possible biases that may happen during the data
extraction process; also, in so doing we had the guarantee
that the data extraction process has been consistent to our
research questions.
On the same line, the classification scheme could have
been another source of threats to the conclusion validity
of our study; indeed, other researchers may identify clas-
sification schemes with different facets and attributes. In
this context, we mitigated this bias by (i) performing an
external evaluation by independent researchers who were
not involved in our research, and (ii) having the data ex-
traction process conducted by the principle researcher and
validated by the secondary researcher.
Internal validity. Internal validity is concerned with the
degree of control of our study design with respect to po-
tential extraneous variables influencing the study itself.
In this case, having a rigorously defined protocol with
a rigorous data extraction form has surely helped in mit-
igating biases related to the internal validity of our re-
search. Also, for what concerns the data analysis validity,
the threats have been minimal since we employed well-
assessed descriptive statistics when dealing with quantita-
tive data. When considering qualitative data, the sensi-
tivity analysis performed on all extracted data has helped
in having good internal validity.
Construct validity. It concerns the validity of extracted
data with respect to our research questions. Construct
validity concerns the selection of the primary studies with
respect to how they really represent the population in light
of what is investigated.
Firstly, as described in Section 3.3, the automatic search
has been performed on multiple electronic databases to
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get relevant studies independently of publishers’ policies
and business concerns. Moreover, we are reasonably con-
fident about the construction of the search string used in
our automatic search since the used terms have been iden-
tified by rigorously applying a systematic procedure (i.e.,
the quasi-gold standard systematic procedure as defined in
Zhang et al. (2011a)). Moreover, the automatic search is
complemented by the snowballing activity performed dur-
ing the search and selection activity of our review process
(see Figure 1), thus making us reasonably confident about
our search strategy. Since our automated search strategy
actually relies on search engines quality and on how re-
searchers write their abstracts, the set of primary selected
studies have been extended by means of the backward and
forward snowballing procedure.
After having collected all relevant studies from the au-
tomatic search, we rigorously screened them according to
well-documented inclusion and exclusion criteria (see Sec-
tion 3.4); this selection stage has been performed by the
principle researcher, under the supervision of the secondary
researcher. Also, in order to assess the quality of the se-
lection process, both principle and secondary researchers
assessed a random sample of studies, and inter-researcher
agreement has been statistically measured with very good
results (i.e., we obtained a Cohen-Kappa coefficient of
inter-rater agreement of more than 0.80).
External validity. It concerns the generizability of the
produced map and of the discovered findings (Wohlin et al.,
2012).
In our research, the most severe threat related to exter-
nal validity consists in having a set of primary studies that
is not representative of the whole research on security for
cyber-physical systems. In order to mitigate this possible
threat, we employed a search strategy consisting of both
automatic search and backward-forward snowballing of se-
lected studies. Using these two search strategies in combi-
nation empowered us in mitigating this threat to validity.
Also, having a set of well-defined inclusion and exclusion
criteria contributed to reinforcing the external validity of
our study.
A potential source of issues regarding the external va-
lidity of our study can be the fact that only studies pub-
lished in the English language have been selected in our
search. This decision may result in a possible threat to va-
lidity because potentially important primary studies pub-
lished in other languages may have not been selected in
our research. However, the English language is the most
widely used language for scientific papers, so this bias can
be reasonably considered as minimal.
Similarly, grey literature (e.g., white papers, not-peer-
reviewed scientific publications, etc.) is not included in
our research; this potential bias is intrinsic to our study
design, since we want to focus exclusively on the state of
the art presented in high-quality scientific papers, and thus
undergoing a rigorous peer-reviewed publication process
is a well-established requirement for this kind of scientific
works.
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Tiwari, A., Dutertre, B., Jovanović, D., de Candia, T., Lincoln, P.D.,
Rushby, J., Sadigh, D., Seshia, S., 2014. Safety Envelope for
Security, in: 3rd Int. Conf. on High Confidence Networked Syst.
(HiCoNS), ACM. pp. 85–94.
Valenzuela, J., Wang, J., Bissinger, N., 2013. Real-time intrusion
detection in power system operations. IEEE Trans. Power Syst.
28, 1052–1062.
Vrakopoulou, M., Esfahani, P.M., Margellos, K., Lygeros, J., An-
dersson, G., 2015. Cyber-Attacks in the Automatic Generation
Control, in: Khaitan, S.K., McCalley, J.D., Liu, C.C. (Eds.), Cy-
ber Physical Systems Approach to Smart Electric Power Grid.
Springer. Power Systems, pp. 303–328.
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